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LONELINESS IN THE CROWD:
WHY NOBODY WANTS OPT-OUT CLASS





This Article addresses the ability of members who have opted out of a
class action to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in their individ-
ual lawsuits against the class defendant. It discusses the reasons why the use
of this device, widely available to any nonparty, has been systematically
denied to opt-out class members. Specifically, their interests are not pro-
tected by the traditional actors in class action litigation: neither the court,
the defendant, nor the class counsel represent their concerns and interests.
Against the prevailing case law, scholarship, and the American Law Insti-
tute's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, Professor Gidi con-
cludes that opt-out class members should be allowed to assert offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion against the class defendant as any nonparty.
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I. INTRODUCTIONPRECLUSION and class actions are an explosive mix. Class actions
are a politically charged and controversial topic because their judg-
ments dispose of the rights of a large number of people who are
not present in the litigation. Most of the problems of issue preclusion in
class action litigation do not differ from those encountered in individual
litigation. Two salient preclusion issues, however, are peculiar to the class
action setting. The first is whether an order denying class certification
precludes future class action certification; i.e., whether a class action that
was not certified by one court can later be certified by another, or
whether the second court is bound by the previous noncertification deci-
sion.1 The second is whether absent class members who have opted out
from the class can assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in their
individual lawsuits against the class defendant as any nonparty could. I
discussed the first problem in a recent publication, as any nonparty
could.2 This Article focuses on the second.
After this brief introduction, Part II concisely presents the subject of
issue preclusion in individual lawsuits and, more specifically, its offensive
1. After decades of controversy and litigation, the issue was finally resolved by the
United States Supreme Court. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) (hold-
ing that an order denying class certification does not preclude the class from obtaining class
certification in a different court); see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.11 (2010).
2. See generally Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class Certification Orders,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (2012) (discussing the multiple reasons why orders denying class
certification have no preclusive effect in future class action certification).
Loneliness in the Crowd
nonmutual use by nonparties. Part III briefly discusses the peculiarities of
issue preclusion in the class action context, completing the introduction.
In Part IV, this Article analyzes the question central to the interrela-
tion between class actions and issue preclusion: the availability of offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion for opt-out class members. Although
highly controversial, this matter has not been adequately addressed by
the courts or scholars. Indeed, most have expressed disapproval at al-
lowing opt-out class members to assert offensive issue preclusion against
the class defendant. Such an approach results from an ill-supported and
erroneous legal interpretation. In addition, by opting out, class members
become outsiders in the class action litigation scene and become alone in
a crowd with no way to express their voice.3
Although most courts and commentators have demonstrated a certain
discomfort in allowing preclusion in such a situation, there is no reason to
depart from the general rule. Opt-out class members, therefore, should
be able to assert issue preclusion whenever the traditional requirements
of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion are present.
II. ISSUE PRECLUSION IN INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
A. ISSUE PRECLUSION REQUIREMENTS
Although this Article focuses on the application of issue preclusion in
the class action context, it is important to understand how the doctrine is
generally applied in individual lawsuits. This Part will focus on the basic
aspects most relevant to the topic at hand. We invite the initiated to skip
this introductory part and move to Part IV, which directly addresses the
subject matter.
Issue preclusion, previously known as collateral estoppel, prevents re-
litigating in a separate lawsuit an "issue" decided in an earlier proceed-
ing.4 Although its primary focus is to avoid relitigating issues of fact,5
issues of law may also be subject to issue preclusion, particularly in its
3. See infra Part IV.I (discussing the lonely position of absent class members who opt
out of a class action).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17(3), 27 (1982); ROBERT C.
CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, Doc-
TRINE, AND PRACTICE 11-12 (2001); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 14.9, at 695-98 (4th ed. 2005); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 14.17, at 635-36 (6th ed. 2011); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 4416 (2d ed. 2002).
5. Compare United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) ("Where .. . a court...
has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand
are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the
same in both cases. But a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action
cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached
upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law."), with Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1979), and United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464
U.S. 165, 170-71 (1984) ("[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to preclude reliti-
gation of both issues of law and issues of fact if those issues were conclusively determined




For issue preclusion to apply, the law imposes these basic require-
ments: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical; (2) the issue was
actually litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; (3) the prior pro-
ceeding afforded a full and fair opportunity for the litigation of the issue;
(4) the issue was necessary to support the outcome of the action; (5) there
was a valid and final judgment on the merits;7 and (6) it was foreseeable
that the issue would later be used against the defendant in a different
proceeding.8
B. THE MUTUALITY DOCTRINE AND ITS EROSION
Historically, the mutuality of estoppel doctrine limited the application
of issue preclusion exclusively to the parties who were bound by the origi-
nal judgment (and their privies).9 It was traditionally believed that the
rules of preclusion must be symmetric, akin to a two-way street. As such,
a third party should not benefit from a favorable judgment unless that
party could also be prejudiced by an unfavorable result. 10
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) & cmt. b (stating that issue
preclusion applies to issues of law, except when "the two actions involve claims that are
substantially unrelated, or ... a new determination is warranted in order to take account of
an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable
administration of the laws"). For a broad discussion, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note
4, at 130-34; FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 14.10, at 704-08; HAZARD, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 14.21, at 642-44 (6th ed. 2011); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 4425. See
also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2005); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2006); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's Interest, 70 IOWA L. REV.
81 (1984).
7. See Adams Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Scranton, 33 F. App'x 28, 31 (3d Cir.
2002); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368
(2d Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17(3), 27; CASAD & CLER-
MONT, supra note 4, at 13-48; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 4416.
8. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (stating that collater-
ally estopping a party from litigating an issue may violate that party's due process rights if
it was unforeseeable that the issue would later be used collaterally against the party). See
generally In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004); Hunter v. City
of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 124 & n.4 (Iowa 1981); Goodson v. McDonough Power
Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 985-86 (Ohio 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 28(5)(b). This is especially true when, in the first action, a party lacked the moti-
vation or incentive to litigate the issue fully and vigorously. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §0 27 cmt. j, 28 cmt. i (1982).
9. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912) ("It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be
mutual."); Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 93(b) (1942) ("[A] person who is not a party or privy to a party to an action in
which a valid judgment other than a judgment in rem is rendered . . . is not bound by or
entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication upon any matter decided in the action.").
10. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal.
1942) ("The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier adjudication
would have been bound by it, had it gone against him."); Comment, Privity and Mutuality
in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 608 (1926) ("The estoppel or bar of the
judgment operates mutually if the one taking advantage of it would have been bound by it,
had it gone the other way."). See generally James Win. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutu-
ality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301 (1961).
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Nevertheless, the mutuality doctrine was never uniformly accepted."
Slowly, courts began to erode the mutuality doctrine until its explicit ab-
rogation in the trailblazing case of Bernhard v. Bank of America, in which
Justice Traynor allowed a third party to assert issue preclusion.12
With the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine, any person may as-
sert issue preclusion against the losing party in an adjudicated proceeding
against another person, contingent on all requirements being present:
identity of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a previous
proceeding with a full and fair opportunity to participate.' 3 But the rule is
asymmetric: issue preclusion cannot be asserted against a nonparty-as
opposed to by a nonparty-because the nonparty in the first instance did
not have an opportunity to participate in the previous litigation.14 Be-
cause the practice allows a third person to assert issue preclusion against
a party in a previous proceeding, but not vice versa, it is commonly called
"one-way issue preclusion." This information will prove relevant in the
discussion below examining the similarities between "one-way interven-
tion" and "one-way preclusion."' 5
C. DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION
Nonmutual issue preclusion can be applied in two ways: one defensive
and another offensive.16
11. For earlier criticisms, see 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL Evi-
DENCE 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John Bowring ed.,
1843), considering mutuality without a "semblance of reason" and stating that "[t]here is
reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in consequence of the verdict given in
a former proceeding to which he was not a party; but there is no reason whatever for
saying that he shall not lose his cause in consequence of the verdict in a proceeding to
which he was a party, merely because his adversary was not." See also Comment, supra
note 10, at 608-09 ("No satisfactory explanation for [mutuality's] use has been discovered
other than some supposed and unprovable principle of 'natural' fairness.").
12. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895 ("No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for
the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action
should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehend."). It is worth noting that Bernhard was decided in 1942, the same
year the first A.L.I. Restatement of Judgments was published. Bernhard opened a new
path, while the first A.L.I. Restatement of Judgments embraced the old tradition of mutu-
ality. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.31, at 597 (1st ed. 1965) (stating that
the first Restatement of Judgments was "out of step with the times").
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17(3) (1982); see supra Part II.A (dis-
cussing the requirements for the application of issue preclusion).
14. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)
("Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evi-
dence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or
more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their posi-
tion."); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. For discussion of the offensive-defensive distinction, see Allan D. Vestal, Law of
the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1967) (differentiating "judgment
claim preclusion" from "judgment issue preclusion"); Allan D. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judi-
cata Variables: Nature of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U. L. REV. 158, 162 (1965); Allan D.
Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 43-76 (1964); Allan
D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 29 (1964); Allan D. Vestal, Res
2013] 5
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Defensive nonmutual issue preclusion allows a defendant to prevent a
plaintiff from relitigating an issue that the plaintiff previously litigated
unsuccessfully against another defendant.' 7 In 1971, the Supreme Court
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation
endorsed the use of defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in federal
courts.' 8 In that case, the University of Illinois sued several alleged patent
infringers.19 Although the patent at issue was declared invalid in one
court, it was later found valid and infringed in another.20 The Supreme
Court decided that it was unreasonable "to afford a litigant more than
one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue,"
and held that the University of Illinois was bound by the prior unfavora-
ble decision invalidating the patent.21
Defensive nonmutual issue preclusion is uncontroversial because it is
unfair to permit a plaintiff "who has had his day in court to reopen identi-
cal issues by merely switching adversaries." 2 2 Its use promotes judicial
economy and efficiency by encouraging plaintiffs to join all potential de-
fendants into one lawsuit, thus reducing the overall amount of litigation.23
In contrast, offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is present when a
plaintiff in a later case attempts to prevent a defendant from relitigating
an issue that the defendant had litigated unsuccessfully in a prior case
against another plaintiff.2 4 It is more controversial than its defensive
Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 359 (1974) (discussing the differ-
ence between issue and claim preclusion ultimately adopted in the Restatements); Allan D.
Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MicH.
L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1968).
17. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979) ("Defensive use
[of nonmutual collateral estoppel] occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff
from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another defen-
dant."); Mann v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 975 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
18. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324. For an earlier decision allowing defensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel in federal courts, see Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,
421 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that "a party who has had one fair and full opportunity to prove
a claim and has failed in that effort, should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of
that claim a second time [against another defendant] ... . unless some overriding consider-
ation of fairness to a litigant dictates a different result in the circumstances of a particular
case" and stating that "the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the
measure of the fairness of the rules of res judicata").
19. Blonder- Tongue, 402 U.S. at 315.
20. Id. at 314-15.
21. Id. at 328-29 ("In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality princi-
ple, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has
fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources.").
22. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942);
see also Comment, supra note 11, at 610 ("These cases appear to establish the rule, that
one who has had his day in court and has lost, cannot reopen identical issues by merely
switching adversaries, and that he cannot take advantage of a judgment in his favor against
an adversary who has had no day in court.").
23. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979).
24. Id. at 326 n.4 ("[O]ffensive use of [nonmutual] collateral estoppel occurs when the
plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previ-
ously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party."); see also Appling v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2003).
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counterpart because: (1) it does not necessarily promote judicial econ-
omy, and (2) it may be unfair to the defendant in certain situations. 25
Because offensive issue preclusion allows a plaintiff to benefit from a
previous judgment against a defendant without the risk of being
prejudiced by it, offensive use may undermine judicial economy by en-
couraging plaintiffs to "sit on the sidelines" and "wait and see" whether
the judgment in the prior case will be favorable. 26 Since the plaintiff is
encouraged not to participate in the first action, the result may be more
litigation. 27
The indiscriminate application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
may also be unfair to the defendant. This unfairness was plainly illus-
trated in the mass litigation context by Professor Brainerd Currie in the
following popular hypothetical.28 A railroad collision injures fifty passen-
gers, all of whom bring individual lawsuits against the railroad. 29 Al-
though the defendant prevails in the first twenty-five suits, a plaintiff
obtains an anomalous victory in the twenty-sixth lawsuit.30 Professor Cur-
rie contends that it would be unfair to allow offensive use of the anoma-
lous judgment to permit the remaining of the plaintiffs to automatically
recover against the railroad.31 The U.S. Supreme Court in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore dealt with this issue by suggesting the denial of issue
preclusion whenever there have been prior inconsistent verdicts.32
The above criticism would be intensified had the outlier victory oc-
curred in the first lawsuit to reach judgment.33 In that situation, applica-
tion of across-the-board nonmutual issue preclusion by the remaining
forty-nine passengers would preclude adjudicating the remaining twenty-
five suits in which the railroad would have won, thereby sealing the fate
of the defendant railroad with an unfair judgment. This is particularly
grave in the context of mass tort litigation where the number of potential
plaintiffs could number hundreds of thousands or even millions.
Although the risk of unfairness to defendants is very real, there is no
reason to litigate an issue indefinitely. At a certain point, once matters
are convincingly settled, enough is enough. Defendants cannot use this
potential for unfairness to shield themselves from issue preclusion, forc-
ing a multitude of victims to face unnecessary expense, time, and effort in
25. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 281 (1957).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 285-86.
31. Id. at 286. It is rarely acknowledged that Currie's famous criticism and hypotheti-
cal was prompted by a similar example found in a student comment published more than
two decades earlier. See Currie, supra note 28, at 285-89 & nn.13-14; Comment, supra note
10, at 611-12.
32. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330.
33. See Byron G. Stier, Another Jackpot (In)justice: Verdict Variability and Issue Pre-




repeatedly proving the same set of facts.34 Therefore, the best opportu-
nity to apply nonmutual issue preclusion in the mass tort setting is only
when a substantial amount of litigation has been consistently resolved
against the defendant, rendering the controversy mature.35
D. OFFENSIVE NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION
Not everyone agrees, however, that there is a fundamental difference
between the offensive and defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion.36
Once the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the defensive use of nonmutual
issue preclusion in federal courts, it was inevitable that the Court would
permit its offensive use as well.37 Indeed, less than a decade later, in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the Supreme Court set forth the general
test for the application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. 38 Park-
lane made it possible for any litigant who was not a party to the original
litigation to later assert offensive issue preclusion against any nonprevail-
ing party in a prior suit.3 9
Parklane involved a shareholder class action against Parklane Com-
pany, alleging that it issued a false and misleading proxy statement re-
lated to a merger.40 After the filing of the class action, but before it
reached a(final decision, the SEC filed and obtained a favorable judgment
in an injunctive suit against Parklane alleging the same defects.41 The
class action plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment against
Parklane, asserting that Parklane was precluded from relitigating the is-
34. But see In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 n.11 (6th Cir. 1984)
(citing Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330 & n.14 (wrongly stating that "[i]n Parklane Hosiery, the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that offensive collateral estoppel could not be used in mass
tort litigation").
35. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69
B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989) (discussing the concept of mature mass tort litigation).
36. See, e.g., Shaid v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 467 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (App. Div.
1983) ("[T]he practical consequences of the distinction between offensive and defensive
use of collateral estoppel are more seeming than real. . . . There is . . . no inherent unfair-
ness or inefficiency in permitting both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note (1982) ("[T]he distinct trend
if not the clear weight of recent authority is to the effect that there is no intrinsic difference
between 'offensive' and 'defensive' issue preclusion.").
37. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97,
124 ("Although Blonder-Tongue ... involved use of collateral estoppel as a shield against
liability rather than as a sword for recovery, the decision will probably come to be regarded
as a milestone in the steady demise of the doctrine of mutuality.") (footnote omitted).
38. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. It is seldom noted that the Parklane court was openly
influenced by an earlier draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments that proposed
abandoning the mutuality doctrine, allowing defensive and offensive issue preclusion.
Parklane at 330 & n.13 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1975)).
39. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29; 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 4464 (2d ed. 2004). But see Jack
Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63, 81-96
(1988) (criticizing offensive use and suggesting class actions as a more fair and efficient way
of dealing with duplicative litigation in the mass tort scenario).
40. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324.
41. Id. at 324-25.
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sues already resolved against it in the SEC action 42 Instead of prohibiting
the use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, the Supreme Court held
that trial courts should have broad discretion to determine when to allow
it.43 Among the elements that courts must consider in exercising their
discretion are the promotion of judicial economy and fairness to the
defendant. 44
To promote judicial economy, courts should discourage plaintiffs from
taking a wait and see attitude and idly sitting on the sidelines while the
first case is being litigated. Therefore, offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion should not be allowed in cases where the plaintiff could have easily
joined the earlier action.45
However, offensive nonmutual issue preclusion does not necessarily
promote judicial economy. The Parklane court was aware of this, ac-
knowledging that:
[O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial econ-
omy in the same manner as defensive use does. . . . Offensive use of
collateral estoppel . . . creates precisely the opposite incentive....
Thus, offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather
than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs
will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in
the first action. 46
It is reasonable to infer, therefore, that judicial economy was not the
main factor, if it was a factor at all, in the Supreme Court's reasoning.47
Parklane recognized that competing considerations are involved in the
application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion and stated that courts
should consider a number of factors. 48 First, the defendant must be able
to foresee that the issue argued in the first lawsuit could potentially arise
again in future litigation and, therefore, have an incentive to litigate it
with appropriate vigor.49 There is no such incentive, in principle, when
the first lawsuit involved a claim of a few thousand dollars while the sec-
ond involved several million. As previously discussed, this requirement is
valid to any application of issue preclusion, even against the same
42. Id. at 325.
43. Id. at 331 ("We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these
problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel,
but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.").
44. Id. at 322-23 ("[T]he general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action or where the application of offensive estoppel would
be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge ... should not allow the use of offensive collateral
estoppel." (emphasis added)).
45. The "easily joined" factor originated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 88(3) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1975), which provided that that application of collat-
eral estoppel may be denied, if the party asserting it "could have effected joinder in the
first action between himself and his present adversary." See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330 n.13.
46. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
47. See id.
48. Id. at 330-32. Several exceptions to the application of one-way issue preclusion
were codified in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(1)-(8) (1982).




Second, the Parklane Court was concerned with the risk that an anom-
alous result in a previous lawsuit would unfairly burden the defendant.
The Court noted the famous Currie hypothetical described above, where
despite several victories, one anomalous loss could forever preclude that
issue in future litigation.51 As a result, the Court held that it would be
unfair to allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion if previous judg-
ments existed in favor of the defendant. 52 The Court did not address the
fact that the very first judgment could be the anomalous one.53
A third concern arises when "the second action affords the defendant
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily
cause a different result."54 The Court gave the example of a case in which
the first action was filed in a forum that was so inconvenient that it im-
paired the party's ability to appropriately litigate the case.55 This factor,
however, could easily be incorporated into the requirement that the prior
proceeding must have afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issues. 56
The three factors discussed above are not exhaustive, as the Court ex-
plained that offensive nonmutual issue preclusion must be denied when-
ever it would be unfair "either for the reasons discussed above or for
other reasons."57 Moreover, these factors are not mandatory elements,
but merely considerations in determining fairness to a defendant when
courts exercise its broad discretion to allow issue preclusion.58
50. See supra Part II.A (discussing the factors a court must consider in the application
of issue preclusion).
51. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Currie hypothetical).
52. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330 n.14. This factor also plays a role in the application of
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion. See supra Part II.A (discussing the factors a court
must consider in the application of issue preclusion).
53. See supra Part II.C, notes 28-35, and accompanying text (proposing application of
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in the mass tort setting "only when a substantial
amount of litigation has been consistently resolved against the defendant, rendering the
controversy nature"); see also McGovern, supra note 35, at 659.
54. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31.
55. Id. at 331 n.15 ("If, for example, the defendant in the first action was forced to
defend in an inconvenient forum and therefore was unable to engage in full scale discovery
or call witnesses, application of offensive collateral estoppel may be unwarranted."); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3)-(4) (1982) (stating that "[a] new determi-
nation of the issue [may be] warranted by differences in the quality .. . of the procedures"
or in the burden of proof).
56. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971)
(holding that the party is bound by an earlier judicial determination of an issue, unless that
party can demonstrate that the previous proceeding "did not [provide] 'a fair opportunity
procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim the first time"' (quoting
Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass. 1960))); supra Part II.A (dis-
cussing the factors a court must consider in the application of issue preclusion).
57. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
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E. CLOSING REMARKS
Whatever one may think of the fairness or the convenience of offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion, it is now commonplace that a third party may
benefit from-without being bound by-issue preclusion.59 The burden is
on the party challenging preclusion to convince the court that it should
not be allowed in the particular case. 60 But, it is generally accepted that
"courts must be more cautious in allowing [issue preclusion] to be used
offensively than in allowing it to be used defensively. "61
Because issue preclusion against a repeat plaintiff is an affirmative de-
fense, it must be pleaded by the party asserting it, or else it is waived.62
Although the burden is ultimately on the party wishing to assert issue
preclusion to bring it to the court's attention, courts sometimes apply is-
sue preclusion sua sponte.63
III. ISSUE PRECLUSION IN CLASS ACTIONS
Class action judgments have issue-preclusive effects in much the same
way as judgments in traditional individual actions. 64 Class members are
bound by the class action judgment in the same manner as parties in an
59. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 n.10 (2010) (considering it "a com-
monplace of preclusion law . . . that nonparties may benefit from . . . former litigation").
But see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 184-88 (discussing criticisms of
nonmutuality).
60. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 14.14, at 727; HAZARD ET AL., supra note
4, § 14.26, at 651.
61. See In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ill. 1988); see also Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331
n.16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 reporter's note, at 99 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1975); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329-30 ("[T]he authorities have been
more willing to permit a defendant in a second suit to invoke an estoppel [defensively]
against a plaintiff who lost on the same claim in an earlier suit than they have been to allow
a plaintiff in the second suit to use offensively a judgment obtained by a different plaintiff
in a prior suit against the same defendant."); Cobin v. Rice, 823 F. Supp. 1419, 1431 (N.D.
Ind. 1993) ("A party asserting offensive collateral estoppel bears a heavier burden than a
party who asserts defensive collateral estoppel."); Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d
544, 548 (Iowa 2002) ("If a party fails to assert offensive issue preclusion at the earliest
practicable time, the unfairness already inherent in offensive issue preclusion will only be
exacerbated."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note (1982) ("[A]
stronger showing that the prior opportunity to litigate was adequate may be required in
[offensive use] than [in defensive use.]"); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1098 (2009).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 311-12 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that where a party had the "the opportunity and the obligation" to raise
the defense of res judicata and they failed to do so, the defense is waived); Kern Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Tenneco's principal obstacle is
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), which includes res judicata as an affirmative defense that must be
raised in the pleadings. Tenneco admits that it did not do so. Therefore, the defense is
waived.").
63. See Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The failure of a defen-
dant to raise res judicata in answer does not deprive a court of the power to dismiss a claim
on that ground."); In re Medomak Canning, 922 F.2d 895, 904 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Even if
appellees waived res judicata as an affirmative defense, a court on notice that it has previ-
ously decided an issue may dismiss the action sua sponte, consistent with the res judicata
policy of avoiding judicial waste."); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 14.9, at 698 (cit-
ing LaRocca v. Gold, 662 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1981)).
64. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra, note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005).
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individual lawsuit.65 Indeed, the same issue preclusion requirements dis-
cussed in the previous part regarding individual litigation must be met for
the doctrine to apply to class action judgments. 66
A class action contains two types of causes of action against the defen-
dant: one is asserted by the class as a whole (the class cause of action) and
the other is asserted by each class member individually (the class mem-
bers' individual causes of action). This leads to what can be called the
"two facets of class action preclusion," because a class judgment binds the
class as a whole (collectively) as well as the class members (individually).
Accordingly, the class as a whole, the individual class members, and the
defendants are bound by the decisions of issues that are essential to the
judgment as long as [all requirements are met.]67
In a straightforward application of traditional preclusion rules follow-
ing a class action judgment, a non-class member can assert offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion against the class action defendant.68 As long as
the issues are the same and all other requirements are present, the defen-
dant will be bound by adjudicated issues in the class action, but unable to
enforce it against nonmembers. 69
The issue preclusion doctrine is also applicable conversely. 70 If all the
requirements are present, in principle, a holding in an individual lawsuit
may have issue-preclusive effect against the defendant in a subsequent
class action.7' Specifically, a class representative may be allowed to assert
nonmutual issue preclusion offensively against a class action defendant,
based on a judgment in a previous individual lawsuit brought by a class
member against that same defendant. 72 The main obstacles to preclusion
in these circumstances are fairness and foreseeability.73 The defendant
may argue that it did not employ all of its efforts in the individual action's
defense because the stakes were substantially lower than in a major class
action.74 Additionally, there is concern that a single anomalous verdict in
65. See id.
66. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) ("A judgment in favor
of either side is conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue actually
litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment."); see also
Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 818 (S.D. Ga. 1987); McCormack v. Abbott
Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1524 (D. Mass. 1985); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1789
& n.23 (3d ed. 2005) (citing Laskey v. UAW, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)); supra Part II.A
(discussing the requirements for the application of issue preclusion).
67. Gidi, supra note 2, at 1027.
68. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effects of
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1849, 1850 (1998); see also infra Part IV.G (discussing the
assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion by non-class members).
69. Hazard et al., supra note 68, at 1850. The issue is fully addressed below. See infra
Part IV.G (discussing the assertion of issue preclusion by non-class members).
70. See Brown v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R., 613 F.3d 44, 47-48, 54 (1st Cir. 2010).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979); Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1982); Stier, supra note 33, at 742-43.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(b) cmt. j (1982).
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an individual lawsuit would seal the fate of an entire industry.75 This
problem, however, would not exist if a large number of individual judg-
ments had reached the same result rendering the controversy mature.76
IV. ISSUE PRECLUSION AND OPT-OUT CLASS MEMBERS
A. THE PROBLEM
Nowhere will we find a more vibrant example of the peculiarities of
preclusion and class actions than in the assertion of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion by opt-out class members against the class defendant.77
Although that debate has been raging since the 1966 amendment of Rule
23, it continues to be one of the most intractable and controversial issues
from both a doctrinal and policy perspective. The resolution of this prob-
lem goes to the essence of issue preclusion and is fundamental to under-
standing the interests at play in a class action.
From a purely practical standpoint, however, this problem has lost part
of its practical importance. First, few class actions are ever certified.78 Of
those that are, most settle,79 and settlements, naturally, do not produce
issue preclusion because the issues have not been fully litigated.80 Second,
individual cases brought in federal courts are often consolidated or coor-
dinated with their respective class actions.81
Once absent class members opt out of a class action, they exit the litiga-
tion, become nonparties, and cannot be bound by the class judgment.82
The opt-out class members are then free to waive their individual rights,
75. See Stier, supra note 33, at 742-43.
76. See supra Part II.C, notes 28-35, and accompanying text (proposing application of
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in the mass tort setting "only when a substantial
amount of litigation has been consistently resolved against the defendant, rendering the
controversy mature"); see also McGovern, supra note 35, at 659.
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v), (3)(B) (providing that class members who do
not want to be included in the judgment may opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action).
78. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in
Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUo. 248, 280 (2010) (report-
ing that, according to a 2007 RAND Institute for Civil Justice Study, less than 15% of class
actions were certified); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIoNs § 1:17
(5th ed. 2011) (reporting the figure above and concluding that "the class probably got
certified as a result of a settlement agreement.")
79. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS AcTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10, 60 (1996) (finding that, of the four districts studied, "a
substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by class-wide settlements");
Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action, 62 IND. L.J. 497, 501
(1987) (noting that, after certification, "most class actions, like most litigation, settle prior
to trial").
80. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("[S]ettlements ordinarily occa-
sion no issue preclusion . . . unless it is clear . . . that the parties intend their agreement to
have such an effect."); 5 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 16:28 (4th ed. 2002) ("The likelihood of settlement may also eliminate collateral estoppel
rights."); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the requirements for the application of issue
preclusion.)
81. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 14-15.
82. See Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, 193 F.3d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that class
members are bound by the class judgment but those who opt-out are not); id. at 425-26
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bring their individual lawsuits, or participate in a different class action,83
even if the class claim received an unfavorable judgment on the merits.
No one can be bound by a judgment unless they are a party, a privy, or an
adequately represented class member.84
Such was the issue in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
where the court held that an opt-out plaintiff is not precluded from liti-
gating an issue decided in favor of the defendant in a prior class action.85
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because an opt-out plaintiff is not a party
to the class action, and thus, not bound by its judgment, "[a] class action
judgment [unfavorable to the class on the merits] cannot be used to col-
laterally estop an opt-out plaintiffs' [sic] action against a defendant in a
separate action."86
The issues resolved in Corrugated Container were simple because pre-
clusion was being asserted against an opt-out class member who was not a
party to the previous class action lawsuit.8 7 This matter is not controver-
sial, and it would have been surprising had the Fifth Circuit decided dif-
ferently and bound the opt-out class member to the unfavorable class
judgment.
Controversy arises, however, when absent members who opted out of
the class assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in their individual
litigation against the defendant after a favorable class judgment.88 In this
scenario, the person against whom preclusion is asserted-the class de-
fendant-was a party in the previous case and had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue. The person seeking the benefit of preclusion-
the opt-out class member-was excluded from the previous case and not
bound by it.
(stating that binding opt-out class members would "defeat the purposes, if not the letter of
Rule 23" and render meaningless their "due process-based right to timely opt out").
83. See, e.g., Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (holding that members who opt out of a federal class action may
bring their own class action in state court), abrogated on other grounds by Tracker Marine,
L.P. v. Ogre, 108 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
84. See supra Part II (discussing the general rules of issue preclusion in individual
actions).
85. In re Corrugated Container, 756 F.2d 411, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 418; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) ("It
is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who ... has never
had an opportunity to be heard."); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 321, 322 n.8 (1977) (explaining the "elementary" legal principle that a person
who was not a party to a prior lawsuit cannot be bound by its result); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("[O]ne is not bound by a judgment . .. in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party . . . .").
87. See Corrugated Container, 756 F.2d at 413, 418-19.
88. A completely different matter, which will not be discussed here, is whether opt-out
class members are precluded from pursuing a punitive damage claim in their individual
lawsuits. See C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Peter M. Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Mem-
bers Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 40 (1981) (arguing that
punitive damage claims belong to society as a whole, not to individual class members, and
suggesting that class members who opt out of a class action be precluded from obtaining
punitive damages in their individual lawsuits).
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Although Parklane involved a class action lawsuit, it did not address
the issue of whether an opt-out class member can assert the preclusive
effect of the class judgment in an individual case against the same defen-
dant.89 As previously discussed, Parklane encourages offensive use of
nonmutual issue preclusion whenever the requirements are present, ex-
cept when it does not promote judicial economy or may be unfair to the
defendant.90 The questions remain, however, whether issue preclusion for
opt-out class members promotes judicial waste or judicial economy, and
whether it is unfair to the defendant. Interpreting these two exceptions
specifically in the unique circumstance of opt-out class members presents
a difficult problem that is still theoretically and practically unsettled. 91
The predominant view holds that a class member who opts out of a
class action should not be allowed to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion against the defendant. 92 Only a few voices speak in favor of
allowing opt-out class members to assert offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion against the defendant, but none in over thirty years.93 Against the
predominant view, however, this Article argues that application of the
general rules of issue preclusion dictate that opt-out class members must
be able to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the class
defendant and that there is no compelling reason to depart from the gen-
eral rule.94
89. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324, 325.
90. See supra Part II (discussing the general rules of issue preclusion in individual
actions).
91. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005).
92. See, e.g., EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that
absent members who fail to opt out are "deemed parties for res judicata purposes," and
those who do opt out are not "bound by or entitled to the benefits of the judgment"); Am.
LAW INST., supra note 1, § 2.07 cmt. g; Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 362-66 (7th Cir. 1987); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at
796; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005); 20 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE & FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK
§ 77 (2d 2011); Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements
in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217. 1245 n.119 (1975) ("An
absentee deciding whether to opt out knows that he cannot use collateral estoppel if the
class wins.").
93. See most recently In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999,
1006 (N.D. Ill. 1978), holding that "plaintiffs who excluded themselves from the Delaware
class are not prohibited by the rule of mutuality from claiming the benefit of the judgment
won by that class." See also Saunders v. Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, Cal., 608
F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The opt-out practice ... does not assume the relitigation
of that which has been settled by class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.").
94. The issue of whether an opt-out class member may assert nonmutual issue preclu-
sion is particularly pressing in defendant class actions. If such class defendants were al-
lowed to opt out from a class action brought against them and therefore to escape the
binding effect of the class judgment and, in addition, were allowed to assert nonmutual
issue preclusion against the plaintiff, this would create a huge incentive for them to opt out,
divesting the defendant class action of any utility. One solution is to allow such defendants
to opt out of the class but not to assert nonmutual issue preclusion. See Note, Defendant
Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630, 635 (1978). The best rule, however, is that defendant
class members should not have opt-out rights. After all, although class plaintiffs may exer-
cise their right not to sue, defendants cannot "opt" not to be sued. See NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, UNIFORM CLAsS ACTIONs [ACT] [RULE] § 8(d) (1976)
(providing that "[a] member of a defendant class may not elect to be excluded"); Vince
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B. PROMOTION OF ECONOMY AND FAIRNESS
One of the "compelling reasons" raised by some to justify a departure
from the rule allowing nonparties to assert offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion relates to the promotion of economy and fairness.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments equates opting out of a class
action with divesting the class representative of the authority to represent
the class member's interests in court.95 The result is that the opt-out class
member is neither bound by a negative class judgment nor benefited by a
favorable one.96
Some courts and commentators believe that allowing opt-out class
members to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the class
defendant would undermine the Parklane policies of economy and fair-
ness because it would permit them to sit on the sidelines and enjoy the
benefits of a favorable judgment in the class suit without running the risk
of being bound by it.97 Indeed, courts fear that this "free rider" problem98
theoretically could encourage class members to opt out en masse and
bring a multitude of individual lawsuits against the defendant.99 There-
fore, in addition to undermining the policies of economy and fairness, it
might also undermine the advantages of class action litigation.100
There is substantial disagreement over whether allowing opt-out class
members to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion promotes or un-
dermines judicial economy.101 On the one hand, allowing it avoids judi-
cial waste by precluding the relitigation of issues previously decided in
the class action.'0 2 On the other hand, it may encourage class members to
Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt Out: Lessons for Canada from the
United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 197, 213 (2004) ("While opt out regimes are
vastly superior to opt in regimes, it is submitted that they should not be applied with re-
spect to defendant representative proceedings.").
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. d, illus. 6 (1982).
96. Id. § 42(1)(c) ("A person is not bound by a judgment for or against a party who
purports to represent him if .. . [b]efore rendition of the judgment the party was divested
of representative authority with respect to the matters as to which the judgment is subse-
quently invoked . . . ."); see also id. § 42 cmt. d, illus. 6.
97. See Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., 782 F.2d 1196, 1202 (4th Cir. 1986) ("To permit a
plaintiff who declines to join a class action . . . to later apply [offensive nonmutual] collat-
eral estoppel to a prior favorable judgment rendered in the class suit could burden the
defendants with multiple suits and may be contrary to the notion of promoting judicial
efficiency.") (footnotes omitted).
98. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965); Ratliff,
supra note 39, at 65 ("Each subsequent plaintiff has a 'heads-I-win, tails-you-lose' advan-
tage.") (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
99. See Ratliff, supra note 39, at 68-70.
100. See Mark W. Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Re-
quiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal
Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745, 753 (1990) ("Scholars have noted this free rider problem
and its consequent unfairness, both to the members of the class and to their attorneys, who
disproportionately bear all of the risks and most of the costs of the litigation.").
101. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 627 F. Supp. 957, 962
(N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
102. See id.
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opt out and pursue their own individual litigation, thereby multiplying
unnecessary lawsuits. 103 Another quite different issue is whether the de-
bate on judicial economy is relevant at all for purposes of offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion. As previously discussed, Parklane recognized
that offensive nonmutual issue preclusion does not necessarily promote
judicial economy and yet approved its use.104
A few courts have allowed opt-out class members to assert offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion to avoid relitigation of the same issues in sub-
sequent individual litigation against the class defendant. 05 This was the
reasoning behind the trial court decisions in both Premier'06 and
TransOcean.107
The Premier court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court, con-
cluding that the trial court's economic argument was fallacious because it
was based on an "ex post perspective on judicial economy."s08 Judge Eas-
terbrook expressed concern with allowing opt-out class members to use
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion because this practice would invite
class members to opt out and bring individual lawsuits.109 As a commen-
tator observed-with a large dose of exaggeration-" [T]here would be
no reason not to opt out."110 Further, if defendants predict that numerous
class members will opt out, they will reduce the amount offered for settle-
ments, in turn encouraging more dissatisfied class members to opt out."'
Judge Easterbrook wrote:
The more attractive it is to opt out-and giving the parties who opt
out the benefit of preclusion makes it very attractive-the fewer set-
tlements there will be, the less the settlements will produce for the
class, and the more cases courts must adjudicate. This is not judicial
economy at work!"x2
103. See id.
104. See supra Part II.D (discussing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
105. See Premier, 627 F. Supp. at 962-63; In re TransOcean Tender Sec. Litig., 455 F.
Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
106. Premier, 627 F. Supp. at 962-63.
107. TransOcean, 455 F. Supp. at 1008.
108. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 366 (7th
Cir. 1987).
109. Id. ("A decision to make preclusion available to those who opt out of a class influ-
ences whether there will be multiple suits. The more class members who opt out may bene-
fit from preclusion, the more class members will opt out. Preclusion thus may increase the
number of suits, undermining the economy the district court hoped to achieve. The effect
of the legal rule may be the opposite of the effect of applying preclusion to a given case. To
determine whether a rule is beneficial, a court must examine how that rule influences fu-
ture behavior .... [T]he application of issue preclusion would multiply the number of suits
and undermine the benefit of class actions in centralizing litigation.").
110. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at 796; see infra Part IV.K (discussing
the difficult financial and technical hurdles opt-out class members face to bring an individ-
ual lawsuit against the class defendant).
111. Premier, 814 F.2d at 366.
112. Id. Moreover, at least theoretically, if class members were to opt out en masse
from the class, the reduction in class size could preclude class certification by putting in
peril a Rule 23 prerequisite: class numerosity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) ("One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members
only if . . . the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. . . .");
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The argument, naturally, cuts both ways. Allowing opt-out class mem-
bers to later assert issue preclusion in their individual lawsuits may en-
courage class settlement because defendants would have a strong interest
in avoiding the establishment of issue preclusion.11 3 In addition, even if
judicial economy were a relevant argument against offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion, it is easily countered. If a class member wants to opt out,
there is no reason to restrain the class member from exercising that right
just because remaining in the class would be more economical. One might
ask the question: Economical for whom? Certainly not for the class mem-
ber who decided opted out.
As Judge Easterbrook noted in Premier, by precluding the opt-out
plaintiff from taking advantage of the favorable class action judgment,
fewer class members would have incentive to opt out. 114 A reduction in
opt-outs would, in effect, reduce the number of individual lawsuits
brought regarding the same cause of action and, thus, conserve judicial
resources.115 Issue preclusion's goal of judicial economy is ultimately fur-
thered even if the price is allowing relitigation of previously decided is-
sues.' 16 The Seventh Circuit accordingly reversed the trial court and held
that an opt-out plaintiff could not assert offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion against the class defendant in a subsequent individual suit.117
However sound the argument raised by the Premier court may be in
principle, it may not survive careful practical analysis. As the TransOcean
court noted, in practice, only a small percentage of class members actu-
ally opt out, and an even smaller number bring individual lawsuits.118
Several decades later, the court's intuition was substantiated by empirical
research.119 Only in cases where the class member's claim is valuable
enough to justify individual litigation would a class member even con-
sider opting out of a class action.120 In these economically viable cases,
class actions are not necessarily the most efficient procedural tool and the
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at 796; RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80,§ 16:28.
113. See supra Part II.A (discussing that for an issue to be precluded it must have been
actually litigated and decided in the prior proceeding).
114. Premier, 814 F.2d at 365-66.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 365.
117. Id. at 367.
118. In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
119. See JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS Ac-
TIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 2-3, 10-12 (1998) (providing the number of class members who
opted out of mass tort settlement class actions); WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 52 ("In
all four districts, the median percentage of members who opted out was either 0.1% or
0.2% of the total membership of the class and 75% of the opt-out cases had 1.2% or fewer
class members opt out."); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs
and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1529, 1566 (2004).
120. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 53 ("For the type of awards in this study-
none of which seem high enough to support individual lawsuits on a contingent fee basis-
one might expect that class members would have more incentive in the larger cases to
remain in the class and recover an award in the thousands of dollars. As the size of the net
average settlement decreases, members have less incentive to file a claim. If totally dissatis-
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class member may recover more pursuing an individual claim, even with-
out the economies of scale. 121 Class members are economic actors and
should not be punished for wanting to maximize their benefit.
The argument of unfairness to the class defendant is equally unconvinc-
ing. It is undeniable that a class action defendant could potentially be
subjected to additional individual lawsuits from opt-out class members.122
While some may perceive this as unfair, it is no more unfair than subject-
ing a defendant in an individual lawsuit to offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion in a later lawsuit by a third party, who would not be bound by the
prior judgment. 123 The number of claims in a class action is a direct con-
sequence of the defendant's alleged conduct and the conflict's size and
type. Whatever the difference between the two situations, it is one of de-
gree, not substance. There is no unfairness in being sued by several peo-
ple: a defendant with a market presence that only allows it to hurt ten
people is potentially subject to only ten lawsuits, but a defendant with a
market presence that allows it to hurt thousands of people is potentially
subject to thousands of lawsuits. This is just how things are. In addition,
considering that, by definition, there is a class-action judgment against
the defendant, the defendant did indeed act wrongfully. A defendant in
these circumstances can hardly allege that being sued several times is
unfair.
People often lose sight that the promotion of procedural economy is
but one aspect a court must consider in allowing assertion of offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion. If it is relevant at all-which is doubtful-
allowing opt-out class members to assert issue preclusion against class
defendants would actually promote economy rather than undermine it.
The argument against fairness is equally flawed: as discussed in the next
Part, the objections to the use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion by
opt-out class members are the same recycled arguments raised in opposi-
tion to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in individual lawsuits. But
that ship sailed a long time ago.124
fied with the amount of the recovery, some members may choose to protest by opting
out.") (citations omitted).
121. See id. ("For very large awards .. . one would expect the opt-out rate to increase as
the size of the expected award increases because individuals with more serious than aver-
age injuries would be able to obtain representation and pursue a larger individual
award.").
122. See Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., 782 F.2d 1196, 1202 (4th Cir. 1986) ("To permit a
plaintiff who declines to join a class action brought under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . to later apply
collateral estoppel to a prior favorable judgment rendered in the class suit could burden
the defendants with multiple suits . . . ."); Roger Furman, Note, Offensive Assertion of
Collateral Estoppel by Persons Opting Out of a Class Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1195
(1980) ("[W]idespread offensive use [of collateral estoppel] could subject the party es-
topped to multiple and often vexatious liabilities.").
123. See supra Part II.D (discussing the general rules of offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion in individual actions).
124. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (allowing the offensive




C. ONE-WAY ISSUE PRECLUSION? A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Allowing an opt-out class member to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion in an individual lawsuit against a class defendant has been
characterized as a return to the old practice of "one-way intervention," a
practice that the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 was designed to abolish. 125
The old spurious class action that existed between the enactment of the
1938 version of Rule 23 until its 1966 amendment was different from the
current Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Most significantly, the old spurious
class actions did not work as an opt-out procedure, in which dissatisfied
class members had to exclude themselves from the class to avoid being
bound by the class judgment. Instead, class members in the original ver-
sion had to "opt in" to an existing class action proceeding to be able to
participate in the judgment. Several commentators even said that it was
not really a class action, but merely a joinder device.
Because very few class members would opt into a class, a few courts,
frustrated with the unrealized potential of class actions, allowed a prac-
tice that became known as "one-way intervention." According to the
practice, class members were able to intervene in the proceeding after the
class action was adjudicated in favor of the class. This allowed them to
benefit from but not be prejudiced by preclusion. The defendants, how-
ever, were in the opposite situation: a loss would potentially bind them
towards the whole class, whereas a victory would bind only the class rep-
resentative and the few class members who had carelessly opted in before
the judgment. 126 The practice was controversial at the time: Some schol-
ars and judges looked askance at this asymmetry of positions, while
others welcomed it as an efficient mechanism to resolve mass disputes.
The criticism equating opt-out members asserting issue preclusion and
the practice of one-way intervention was popular in the early years fol-
lowing the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.127 For example, one commenta-
125. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005). FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment on subdivision (a)(3), reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69 (1966).
126. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961)
(one of the last cases before the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 where one-way intervention
was allowed); York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ("Since, in a [spurious] class suit,. . . a judgment
will not be res judicata for or against those of the class who do not intervene, we suggest
that if, after trial, the court finds against the defendant, appropriate steps be taken to notify
all such noteholders to intervene (if they have not theretofore done so), judgment to be
entered in favor only of those who do so within a reasonable time."). See generally Harry
Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 684, 691 (1940); Comment, The Spurious Class Suit: Procedural and Practical
Problems Confronting Court and Counsel, 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 632-33 (1959). See also
Dam, supra note 37, at 125 (for a more recent discussion proposing the "elimination of the
notice requirement and the return to one-way intervention").
127. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 814 F.2d 358,
362-64 (7th Cir. 1987); In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1006
(N.D. Ill. 1978); RICHARD 0. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., ABA, SEC. OF LITIG., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CLASS ACTION IMPROVEMENTS
(1986), reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 195, 206-07 (1986).
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tor said that "[t]here is little practical difference between intervening
post-judgment to benefit from a favorable judgment [as with one-way in-
tervention] and bringing suit on one's own, armed with the favorable
judgment as collateral estoppel [as with offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion]. "128
This reasoning was sanctioned by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, the re-
porter of the Advisory Committee who drafted the 1966 amendment to
Rule 23 and Professor Charles Allan Wright.129 Professor Kaplan ob-
served that "it would be anomalous to give one who opts out collateral
estoppel benefits of the action from which he deliberately removed him-
self."130 Charles Allan Wright and Arthur Miller said famously that this
practice would "make a mockery of the notice and opting-out procedure"
that specifically provide that a class member who opts out is excluded
from the class and from the judgment.131 The support from such preemi-
nent figures proved extremely influential and the echoes of the hypotheti-
cal opt-out class member asserting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
and making a mockery of Rule 23 was repeated for decades.132 To this
day, this approach commands the misguided support of courts and
scholars.133
There is no doubt that the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 ended the then-
budding practice of one-way intervention by switching from an opt-in
into an opt-out model.134 Although the advisory committee note ex-
pressly recognized its demise by overhauling the whole structure of the
128. Comment, supra note 92, at 1244-45 ("An absentee, after having requested exclu-
sion, may not benefit from a favorable judgment by arguing that the representation turned
out to be unexpectedly good. This would be a true return to one-way intervention. Neither
can an absentee who has excluded himself 'invoke a judgment in favor of the class as
collateral estoppel in a jurisdiction that does not require mutuality as a condition on the
application of collateral estoppel.' Rule 23 does not say whether such a practice would be
permissible, but it seems clear that the purpose of amending the rule to preclude one-way
intervention would prohibit such a practice.") (footnotes omitted).
129. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 391 n.136 (1967) (citing 2
W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 572, at 96-97 (C.
Wright ed., Supp. 1966)).
130. Id.; see also 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005) ("Notions of
collateral estoppel are not so inexorable that a party who has affirmatively sought exclu-
sion from a judgment later must be allowed to rely on it. The better view thus is that one
who opts out of a class action cannot claim collateral-estoppel benefits from the judg-
ment.") (footnote omitted).
131. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1789, at 183-84 (1972).
132. See Comment, supra note 92, at 1245-46 (1975) (quoting the "mockery" remark
and referring also to "the specter of one-way intervention"); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 4, § 1789 (3d ed. 2005); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 92, § 77 (2012).
133. See, e.g., Premier, 814 F.2d at 362-66; AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 2.07 cmt. g
("Denial of both the preclusive benefit and the preclusive detriment of the class judgment
is consistent with the longstanding goal to prevent one-way intervention in class actions
when absent class members have the opportunity to opt out."); CASAD & CLERMONT,
supra note 4, at 179-80; FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at 796.
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment, re-




class action system, the text of the rule did not expressly prohibit the
practice (mainly because it did not need to do so) nor did it express any
antagonism to the practice.'35
But one cannot understand the above controversy in a vacuum; it is
important to contextualize it in historical perspective. The 1966 amend-
ment to Rule 23 originated at a time when the doctrine of "mutuality of
estoppel" was still strong and had disciples in academia and in the
courts. 3 6 Consequently, the only reason why some were outraged by the
practice of one-way intervention was because of the doctrine of mutual-
ity's popularity at the time. Indeed, the reasoning raised against one has
always been the same reasoning raised against the other.137
But when the old practice of one-way intervention is viewed with mod-
ern eyes, not blurred by blind adherence to the mutuality doctrine, one
can see that it was merely a pretext to circumvent the then-already obso-
lete doctrine of mutuality138 in dealing with the practical reality of an
inefficient opt-in class action.139 This was the perspective that moved the
proponents of one-way intervention, who wanted to realize the potential
of class actions to resolve mass conflicts.140 So, if it is true that the 1966
amendment to Rule 23 repealed the old practice of one-way intervention,
it did so not by rejecting it, but by modernizing the outdated opt-in class
action into an opt-out class action and in essence creating the modern
class action for damages.
The connection between the old practice of one-way intervention and
135. See id.; see also Kaplan, supra note 129, at 385-86; James Wm. Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J.
551, 570-72 (1937) (explaining the proposed changes to class action rules from old Equity
Rule 38 to the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
136. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
137. See, e.g., James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L.
REV. 307, 318-21 (1937) (detailing the historical development of the spurious class action
as a vehicle for intervention when a common question of law or fact predominates);
Moore, supra note 136, at 574-75 (explaining that through intervention into spurious class
actions, parties and their privies would be bound by litigation results while those who did
not opt in would not); see also Friedman, supra note 102, at 752 (explaining that the Advi-
sory Committee "largely occupied itself with preventing individual litigants . . . from inter-
vening after a favorable judgment" because "[s]uch 'post-judgment one way intervention'
was criticized for lacking 'mutuality"'); Kaplan, supra note 129, at 385-86 (referring to
critics who consider that the practice was "heretical" or "distasteful" because it was "one-
way" and "lacking mutuality" and that "only by a perverse anomaly could there be such a
thing as a class action that did not run fully for or against the class") (footnote omitted);
Comment, supra note 94 at 1242-46 (1975).
138. As previously discussed, some considered the doctrine of mutuality to be outdated
even at the time it was adopted by the Restatement (First) of Judgments in 1942. See
JAMES, supra note 12, § 11.31, at 597 (considering the Restatement (First) of Judgments
"out of step with the times"). In the following decades, the doctrine of mutuality slowly fell
in disfavor, first with Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 122
P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (defensive use), then with Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971) (defensive use), and finally Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (offensive use). See supra Part II.B
(discussing the erosion of the mutuality doctrine).
139. See JAMES, supra note 12, § 10.18, at 500 (considering the practice of one-way in-
tervention as a way to give more effectiveness to the old spurious opt-in class action).
140. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 126, at 718 n.98 (1940).
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the much older doctrine of mutuality is undeniable. 141 It did not help that
the expression "one-way intervention" was very similar to "one-way pre-
clusion," which was a common expression used at the time to designate
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. 142 Therefore, the association of
one-way intervention with all the criticisms of one-way preclusion was
simply impossible to resist. Inevitably, those who favored or opposed the
old practice of one-way intervention did so using the same arguments
traditionally used to favor or oppose one-way preclusion. 143
Not until 1979, more than a decade after the enactment of the 1966
amendment to Rule 23, did the Supreme Court completely abandon the
mutuality doctrine in federal courts.144 In essence, by allowing the appli-
cation of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in Parklane, the Court ret-
roactively sanctioned the practice of one-way preclusion.145 From
Parklane accepting one-way preclusion, one could infer that the Supreme
Court had evolved to the point that it did not show a significant aversion
to the old practice of one-way intervention. Nowhere did the Supreme
Court make its new position clearer than in the 2011 opinion of Smith v.
Bayer Corp., where it considered "a commonplace of preclusion law-
141. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 37, at 124 ("This criticism of one-way intervention is
simply a criticism of the abolition of the mutuality limitation on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel."); Kaplan, supra note 129, at 391; Friedman, supra note 100, at 752; JAMES, supra
note 12, § 10.18, at 501 (equating one-way intervention to one-way issue preclusion by
stating that "[a] similar result [to one-way intervention] would be produced by collateral
estoppel ... if the doctrine of mutuality were abandoned").
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
143. Compare Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 126, at 713 ("[T]here is by no means
complete symmetry between binding the defendant to a favorable decree and binding the
absentee to an unfavorable decree. Clearly, the defendant has been afforded his day in
court; he has had the opportunity to present his case fully in his own right, and he has lost.
He has no more reason to relitigate the entire controversy against the absentee members
than he has to do so against the immediate plaintiff."), and JAMES, supra note 13, § 10.18,
at 501 (stating that one-way intervention "may do violence to the sportsman's code" but
considering it justified in the case of mass claims), and Mendez v. Radec Corp., 260 F.R.D.
38, 45 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Just as the rule against one-way intervention 'bars potential class
members from waiting on the sidelines to see how the lawsuit turns out and, if a judgment
for the class is entered, intervening to take advantage of the judgment,' so too defendants
should not be permitted to wait and see how the [district] [c]ourt will rule on plaintiffs
summary judgment and Rule 23 class certification motions. . . .") (internal citation omit-
ted), with ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF Eourry 280 (1950) ("Going back
to the idea that the outsiders can participate in a victory without bearing the burdens of
defeat, I shall simply point out its total inconsistency with the long-settled rule that res
judicata always cuts both ways. A person is either all in or all out. As with William James'
cocktail, he must take the bitter with the sweet-or else not drink any of it.") (internal
footnote omitted).
144. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326-31; supra Part II.B (discussing the erosion of the
mutuality doctrine). The conflict between the Supreme Court repudiation of one way inter-
vention and later abandonment of mutuality led Kenneth Dam to ask whether the Su-
preme Court knew what it was doing when it approved the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.
Dam, supra note 37, at 125; see also John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride
of Frankenstein: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34
U. KAN. L. REv. 255, 257 (1985) (noting the contradiction in the Supreme Court rejecting
one-way intervention in the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 and abandoning the mutuality
rule in the 1979 Parklane decision).
145. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-31.
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that nonparties sometimes may benefit from, even though they cannot be
bound by, former litigation." 1 4 6 Therefore, any opposition to allowing
opt-out class members to assert one-way preclusion based exclusively on
the 1966 amendment's repudiation of the old practice of one-way inter-
vention is misplaced, and it has been for quite some time.147
It is true that these two situations are different. On the one hand, in the
context of individual litigation, a person who had chosen not to be a part
of, did not know about, or had no possibility of intervening in the lawsuit,
later wants to benefit from a favorable result. On the other hand, in the
context of class action litigation, an absent class member who purpose-
fully excludes himself from the class, deliberately choosing not to partici-
pate in an ongoing class action, later wants to benefit from the class
judgment. Although one can argue that principles of fairness might not
favor the second situation, the principles so far discussed outweigh any
difference between these two situations.
The Seventh Circuit in Premier drew a conclusion opposite to the one
proposed in this Article.148 The court held that:
The revision of Rule 23 in 1966 does away with one-way intervention
in class actions. It should stay done-away-with until the Supreme
Court adopts a new version. Whether class members should get the
benefit of a favorable judgment, despite not being bound by an unfa-
vorable judgment, was considered and decided in 1966. That decision
binds us still. 149
146. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 n.10 (2011) (relying on both Parklane
and Blonder- Tongue).
147. See Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J.
1204 (1966) ("If the court applies collateral estoppel without the mutuality requirement, a
member of a (b)(3) class who chooses to be excluded from the action may in a subsequent
action still take advantage of a judgment favorable to the class, although he would not be
bound in any way if the class judgment were unfavorable."). Cohn's article was written
more than a decade before Parklane and a few years before Blonder-Tongue. See also
Dam, supra note 37, at 124 ("If the courts are willing to abolish mutuality of estoppel for
the benefit of a single party on the ground of efficiency, which was the rationale in
Blonder-Tongue, then surely the case for retaining the mutuality principle in class actions
where hundreds of thousands of claims are involved is tenuous.") (footnote omitted);
Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 647
(1971) ("[I]s hostility to 'one-way intervention' justifiable in a jurisdiction that has de-
parted from the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel?"); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Ac-
tions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 53 n.69 (1965) (questioning whether, in jurisdictions
that abandoned mutuality, opt-out class members would be able to assert issue preclusion
against the class defendant in a subsequent individual lawsuit).
148. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 364 (7th
Cir. 1987).
149. Id. (emphasis added). The specific facts in Premier, however, are not congruent
with the old practice of one-way intervention because Premier was not interested in inter-
vening in the original class action that it had opted out of in order to take advantage of the
settlement or award: it had brought its own lawsuit and merely wanted to benefit from
preclusion. Id. at 360-61, 366-67. The following case better exemplifies the impermissible
one-way intervention. In Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Finance Corp., 483 F.2d
450 (10th Cir. 1973), two class members who originally opted out of a class later moved to
participate in the proceeds generated by the class judgment, but were not allowed to bene-
fit from the fund. Id. at 451-52 ("The right to intervene after judgment is precisely what
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to prevent ... . This action is an ingenious
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It is difficult to grasp exactly what "new version" of Rule 23 the Pre-
mier court expected to see enacted. By the time Premier was decided in
1987, the U.S. Supreme Court had already adopted a new paradigm in
Blonder- Tongue and Parklane, completely abandoning the mutuality doc-
trine and instituting a new rule for nonparty preclusion that differed from
the one that existed at the time of the 1966 Amendment.150 How much
more clearly should the Supreme Court have spoken to convince the Pre-
mier court that a new version of Rule 23 was already in place?151
The fact remains that Parklane completely changed the equation. Once
the Supreme Court approved one-way preclusion, it is doubtful that it
would have opposed the old practice of one-way intervention. Besides,
such a "new version" of Rule 23 existed long before Parklane was de-
cided. As a commentator noted over thirty years ago, the 1966 abandon-
ment of one-way intervention based on the principle of mutuality was
anachronistic even at the time.152
The Premier court briefly hesitated, recognizing that a development on
the legal tradition must have an impact on the interpretation of a rule.153
Judge Easterbrook admitted that "[t]he drafters of new Rule 23 assumed
that only parties could take advantage of a favorable judgment" 154 and
that they "did not anticipate that courts would give preclusive effect to
judgments in the absence of mutuality."155 By "severely curtail[ing] the
mutuality doctrine in federal litigation," Judge Easterbrook recognized
that Blonder-Tongue and Parklane "washed away the foundation on
which the edifice of Rule 23 had been built."' 56 He then admitted that
attempt to get back into a class action lawsuit and take advantage of a judgment after
electing not to participate."). Sarasota is a textbook example of inadmissible one-way
intervention.
150. See supra Part II.B (discussing the erosion of mutuality of estoppel).
151. See infra Part IV.D (further discussing the emergence of a "new version" of Rule
23 that could satisfy the Premier court).
152. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1395-96 (1976)
("Defense of the 1966 rule in terms of the principle of mutuality-that it is unfair to bind
one party to an adverse judgment if the other party would not also have been bound in the
event of defeat-would, of course, be anachronistic."); see also Furman, supra note 122, at
1212-13 (stating that "[d]isapproval of one-way intervention for its lack of mutuality pro-
motes a doctrine that has been abandoned by the federal courts and is particularly inappro-
priate in the class context" and that "a court considering whether to allow opting out
parties collateral estoppel rights should not deny those rights merely on the grounds that
one-way intervention would result. It should deny collateral estoppel where one-way inter-
vention would encourage unnecessary claims filed by persons entertaining a wait-and-see
attitude") (footnotes omitted).
153. Premier, 814 F.2d at 361-65.
154. Id. at 362.
155. Id. This assertion is only partially correct. The trend towards abandonment of mu-
tuality, at least of the defensive type, began several decades earlier and intensified in 1942,
about twenty five years before the 1966 amendment. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942). The project of the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments, which started in early 1970, also abandoned mutuality in its earlier drafts,
including allowing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Some federal courts had aban-
doned mutuality as early as 1950. See, e.g., Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,
421-23 (3d Cir. 1950); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the erosion of mutuality of
estoppel).
156. Premier, 814 F.2d at 362.
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"[o]ne could reply that the effect of the 1966 revision on one-way inter-
vention was just a supposition of the drafters. They enacted the rule, not
its effects, and the translation from rule to effects depended on mutuality
of estoppel. When the mutuality requirement died, the effects of Rule 23
changed."157
Judge Easterbrook would have reached a correct interpretation had he
stopped his analysis there, but he continued. The initial hesitation, there-
fore, was short-lived simply because, according to the court, the issue had
been "anticipated and resolved" by the Advisory Committee: "Even if a
court sometimes may allow the effects of the 1966 revision of Rule 23 to
diverge from the course planned by the Advisory Committee, such a
modification would not be appropriate when the very problem at hand
was anticipated and resolved."' 58
It is an exaggeration to say that the Advisory Committee "anticipated
and resolved" the issue discussed in Premier. First, although the Advisory
Committee expressly abolished the practice of one-way intervention, it
did not elaborate: it merely stated that there were conflicting decisions on
the matter and concluded tersely that "one-way intervention is ex-
cluded."1 59 Nothing was said for or against the practice and no reasons
for the change were given.
The debate leading to a rejection of one-way intervention is not found
in the advisory committee notes, but in contemporaneous law review arti-
cles and cases. One would expect therefore to see in Premier an extensive
discussion of the legislative history that allowed Judge Easterbrook to
conclude that "[a] principal purpose of the 1966 revision of Rule 23 was
to end 'one-way intervention.' 1 6 0 Throughout the opinion, Judge Easter-
brook conjectures what the drafters "assumed," 161 "anticipat[ed]," 1 62 or
"suppos[ed]."1 63 Yet nowhere did he discuss any authority that justifies
the theory he built about the intent of the drafters of amended Rule 23.
Second, technically, the 1966 Amendment did not prohibit the practice
of one-way intervention; it merely made it inapplicable by switching the
class action from an opt-in to an opt-out model. It is impossible to deter-
mine whether the Advisory Committee would have prohibited one-way
intervention had the opt-in model been maintained. One thing is to abol-
ish one-way intervention and adopt a modern opt-out class action, some-
thing quite different is to abolish the practice while retaining an
inefficient opt-in class action system.
157. Id. at 365.
158. Id. It seems that Judge Easterbrook opposes the use of legislative history, unless
"the very problem at hand" was "anticipated and resolved." One is left without guidance
about when to use legislative history in statutory interpretation.
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment, re-
printed in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
160. Premier, 814 F.2d at 362.
161. Id. at 362.
162. Id. at 362-63.
163. Id. at 364.
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Third, it is wrong to say that the Advisory Committee "anticipated and
resolved" the issue discussed in Premier because the notes said nothing
about opt-out class members asserting offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion against the class defendant. 164 Such a possibility did not exist in fed-
eral courts at the time and would not exist until 1974-almost a decade
after the 1966 amendment-when Parklane allowed it. The Advisory
Committee only referred to the practice of "one-way intervention."
The Premier court also held that:
Parklane is not a sufficient reason to upset the balance struck in Rule
23. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure have
the effect of statutes. A development in the common law of judg-
ments is not a reason to undo a statute, to treat a thorough rethink-
ing of the law as so much fluff.1 6 5
This analysis, however, is hardly a convincing reason to persist with
abandoned practices based on anachronistic ideals of justice or dogmas
on statutory interpretation. Quite the contrary, it represents a misguided
use of legislative history that trumps both the meaning and the logic be-
hind a legal rule that must be interpreted within its broader procedural
context.
Judge Easterbrook has published several law review articles and judi-
cial opinions about the use of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion. Despite having demonstrated to be more receptive than other
textualists to the use of legislative history as a persuasive source,'16 6 he
has always strongly advocated against such practice.16 7 According to
Judge Easterbrook, the subjective intent of the legislature cannot be de-
termined.168 Even if it could, it does not represent the law, for law is only
164. It is, therefore, incorrect for Judge Easterbrook to state: "Whether class members
should get the benefit of a favorable judgment, despite not being bound by an unfavorable
judgment, was considered and decided in 1966." Premier, 814 F.2d at 364. Such a conclu-
sion can only be made by conflating one-way intervention and one-way preclusion.
165. Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
166. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Legisla-
tive history may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the assump-
tions its authors entertained about how their words would be understood."); Frank. H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. PUB.
PoL'Y 61, 62 (1994) [hereinafter Text History] ("We use our knowledge of the times in
which the texts were written to deduce the purposes, goals, objectives, and values of the
drafters."); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 441, 443 (1990) [hereinafter Legislative History].
167. See Text History, supra note 166, at 62 (considering himself "a notorious opponent
of legislative history"); see also Frank Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the
Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textual-
ism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988);
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70
(2006) (discussing extensively Judge Easterbrook's "new textualism" philosophy and how
it departs from the use of legislative history).
168. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983)
("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,'
hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a
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the enacted text.169 It seems that, by giving such prominence to an un-
committed, meaningless, passing sentence in the advisory committee
notes, Judge Easterbrook in Premier may have violated his own canons of
interpretation. 170
In any event, it remains remarkable that the TransOcean court allowed
the assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion before the Supreme
Court decided Parklane, and the Premier court denied it after the Court
decided Parklane.171
In conclusion, any opposition to opt-out class members asserting offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion is grounded on an outdated fetish for the
mutuality doctrine and disregards current civil procedure developments.
The next Part will continue the historical analysis by discussing whether
the rejection of one-way intervention half a century ago, at a time when
the mutuality doctrine was still accepted, still rules from the grave. It will
show that, contrary to the assumptions Premier, a new class action model
has already emerged, one that must be interpreted as an organic part of
modern civil procedure.
D. THE "UNIQUE" SITUATION IN PREMIER
Arguably, the court's outrage at the specific circumstances of the case
may explain at least some of the Premier court's reasoning, particularly
because the trial court certified the class and issued a ruling on the merits
at the same time.172 In Premier, the class notice was not issued until sev-
whole, however, has only outcomes."); id. at 547-48 ("[It is] impossible for a court-even
one that knows each legislator's complete table of preferences-to say what the whole
body would have done with a proposal it did not consider in fact."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Understanding the Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 284,
284 (1992) ("[T]he concept of 'an' intent for a person is fictive and for an institution hilari-
ous."); Text History, supra note 166, at 68 ("Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for
a collective body."); Legislative History, supra note 166, at 441, 446-47 (1990) ("It is mis-
leading to speak of 'the legislature' as an entity with a mind or purpose or intent, and
wrong to assume that the compromises necessary to enact laws are uniformly public-
spirited.").
169. See Text History, supra note 166, at 67 ("[S]tatutory text and structure, as opposed
to legislative history and intent (actual or imputed), supply the proper foundation for
meaning."); id. at 68-69 ("[Tjhe structure of our Constitution . .. requires agreement on a
text by two Houses of Congress and one President. No matter how well we can know the
wishes and desires of legislators, the only way the legislature issues binding commands is to
embed them in a law"); Legislative History, supra note 166, at 441 ("[T]he subjective intent
of legislators .. . can be found and, . . . represents 'the law' if found."); id. at 444 ("The text
of the statute-and not the intent of those who voted for or signed it-is the law."); id. at
445 ("What distinguishes laws from the results of opinion polls conducted among legisla-
tors is that the laws survived a difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a two
thirds vote or obtained the President's signature.").
170. The advisory committee notes may offer a more reliable standard than other
sources of legislative history. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1283
(1995) (stating that the objections to the use of traditional types of legislative history do
not apply to the advisory committee notes).
171. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); Premier, 814 F.2d at
367; In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
172. Premier, 814 F.2d at 359-60, 363.
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eral years after the class was certified, the class judgment was affirmed on
appeal, and the case was settled, making an earlier opt-out impossible. 173
This led the Judge Easterbrook to state that if class members can decide
whether to exercise their right to opt out after they know of the judgment
or terms of settlement, "it's one-way intervention all over again." 174
The Premier court was fixated on the language of Rule 23, which stated
that the court should certify a class action "as soon as practicable" after it
was filed.175 According to the court, such an early decision compels class
members to choose whether to stay in or opt out of the class well before
knowing the outcome of the litigation:
The prompt decision on certification would . . . prevent the absent
class members from waiting to see how things turned out before de-
ciding what to do. ... So a person's decision whether to be bound by
the judgment-like the court's decision whether to certify the class-
would come well in advance of the decision on the merits. Under the
scheme of the revised Rule 23, a member of the class must cast his
lot at the beginning of the suit and all parties are bound, for good or
ill, by the results. Someone who opted out could take his chances
separately, but the separate suit would proceed as if the class action
had never been filed.176
The language that the Premier court used is clearly evocative of games
and gambling, e.g., "cast his lot" and "take his chances."' 77 This is the
exact mindset the Supreme Court expressly repudiated almost a decade
earlier by citing Bentham's idea that mutuality was
a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the
gaming-table to the bench. If a party [is] benefited by one throw of
the dice, he will, if the rules of fair play are observed, be prejudiced
by another: but that the consequence should hold when applied to
173. Id. at 363 ("The district judge decided the merits and certified the case as a class
action simultaneously, more than three years after it had been filed. The judge then did not
give the Rule 23(c)(2) notice for another 2 1/2 years, by which time the judgment had been
affirmed [on appeal] and the case had been settled. So by the time Premier and the other
members of the class were asked to choose, they knew how the case had come out."). This
information will prove relevant later, as I discuss the fact that this late opt-out notice made
it impossible for Premier to opt out from the class earlier than it did. See infra note 219 and
accompanying text.
174. Premier, 814 F.2d at 363.
175. Id. at 362. The original language was found in then Rule 23(c)(1): "As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory commit-
tee's note to 2003 amendment. In 2003, the rule was amended and the current language is
found in Rule 23(c)(1)(A). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) ("At an early practicable time after
a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order
whether to certify the action as a class action."). The change from "as soon as practicable"
to "at an early practicable time" merely reflected the prevailing practice at the time. So the
amendment was intended more to adapt the text of the rule to reality than to change it. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendment.




justice, is not equally clear.' 78
A decision on the merits or settlement entered before class certifica-
tion, notice, and an opportunity to be heard, would indeed create a situa-
tion parallel to the old one-way intervention. 17 9 Although it is true that
the certification decision should generally be expected to come before the
decision on the merits, there are numerous situations in which it may be
appropriate to delay class certification.180 For example, defendants may
elect to postpone a decision on certification until after a decision on the
merits has been reached.18 And, as will be discussed further, it is now
quite common for class certification (and class notice) to occur simultane-
ously with a preliminary approval of the settlement.182
But it is clear that as more time passes, the more irrelevant the Premier
reasoning becomes. Long established developments in class action prac-
tice and even amendments to Rule 23 show that the Premier court's con-
cerns are exaggerated (as they were at the time the case was decided) or
irrelevant. Not only is it more common for courts to wait until a settle-
ment is reached before certifying a class and sending notice to absent
class members,183 a not-so-recent practice has flourished where class ac-
tions are filed with a settlement already in place and the certification's
sole purpose is to give binding effect to its terms (settlement class ac-
tions).184 Notice, right to opt out, and opportunity to be heard come only
after a settlement is reached.
In addition, in the almost 30 years since Premier was decided, Rule 23
has undergone significant changes, being amended in 1987, 1998, 2003,
2007, and 2009. The Supreme Court has also issued several opinions and
Congress has enacted major statutes, considerably altering the outlook of
class action litigation.
178. See 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827), re-
printed in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843), quoted in
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971).
179. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 152, at 1394 n.18 ("[T]he
risk of de facto one-way intervention would increase if a decision on the merits were en-
tered prior to any certification decision.").
180. See Mendez v. Radec Corp., 260 F.R.D. 38, 44-45 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining
that practically speaking, the certification decision should ordinarily be reached before a
decision on the merits).
181. See Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("[A] defendant may waive the protections Rule 23(c) offers and elect to have the merits
decided before the class certification question . . . ."); Ahne v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 102
F.R.D. 147, 151 (E.D. Wis. 1984) ("[TJhe courts have carved out a limited exception for
those defendants willing to forego the protections attendant on early determination of the
class issue.").
182. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618-19 (1997) (stating that
the certification of classes exclusively for settlement purposes has become a "stock
device").
183. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 35 (stating that in mid-1990, in "18% of all
certified class actions . . . a proposed settlement was submitted to the court before or
simultaneously with the first motion to certify").
184. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 618-19.
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For example, since a 2003 amendment, Rule 23 allows-if not man-
dates-a second opportunity for a back-end opt out after a class settle-
ment is reached, when the class members know the outcome of the
litigation.185 Needless to say, opting out after class members know the
terms of the settlement is not much different from opting in when they
know the result of the judgment. The second was called "one-way inter-
vention" while the first could well be called "one-way exclusion." So
much for a rejection of one-way intervention.
Decrying the fact that the 2003 amendment did not have a substantial
impact, the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Ag-
gregate Litigation (Principles) decided to go a step further, providing a
presumption in favor of a second opportunity for opting out of the
class.186 The ALI Principles assume, correctly, that "the likelihood of a
second opt-out would have the salutary effect of forcing the parties to
reach terms that are sufficiently attractive to deter massive opt-outs." 187
Moreover, it is also possible, although not yet common for class settle-
ments to provide opt-out class members with an opportunity to opt back
in to the class if they wish.188
The modern class action practice has evolved from a game in which
absent class members could only opt out before knowing the final result
of the litigation to this "new version" of class actions, which is no differ-
ent from playing with marked cards. As a matter of fact, the past century
witnessed a fundamental change in the character of litigation in general,
moving it away from a gentleman's duel and into a public function. Mod-
ern civil procedure repudiates trials by ambush and harmless errors; fa-
vors decisions on the merits; encourages offensive nonmutual issue
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4) ("If the class action was previously certified under Rule
23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity
to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request
exclusion but did not do so."); see also George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice
and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 258 (1996)
(proposing the back-end opt out exactly because class members would already know the
outcome of the settlement); id. at 295 ("Class members should be allowed to opt out at the
time when they are most likely to receive information about how well their interests have
been protected by the class action: either after a proposed settlement or just before trial.").
But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 119, at 1544 ("In the case of litigation classes in
which the action is certified prior to a settlement, class members must elect to opt out or
remain in the case at the time of certification. Once the case is settled, class members who
have not opted out may object to the settlement but ordinarily may not opt out."); id. at
1544 n.64 ("This is not true in the unusual situation where, post settlement, the court allows
a second round of opt-out rights to class members who previously did not exercise their
right to exclude themselves.").
186. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 3.11, at 242 ("In any class action in which the
terms of a settlement are not revealed until after the initial period for opting out has ex-
pired, class members should ordinarily have the right to opt out after the dissemination of
notice of the proposed settlement. If the court refuses to grant a second opt-out right, it
must make an on-the-record finding that specific reasons exist for its refusal.").
187. Id. § 3.11, at 243.
188. See, e.g., Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) ("Class Counsel mailed over 100 'Opt In Letters' to Class Members who had previ-
ously opted out of the Settlement, advising them of their right to opt back in to the Settle-
ment during the Revised Notice period.").
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preclusion; allows simple pleadings, flexible amendments (including rela-
tion back) and flexible joinder provides for broad discovery (the all-
cards-on-the-table ideal), voluntary disclosure, and the sharing of work
product; and encourages court participation and management and the
resolution of disputes through alternatives to litigation.
The Premier court did not specify how to recognize the beginning of a
new version of class action litigation. Although Premier did not perceive
it at the time, it is certainly here now.18 9
The next Part discusses a side of Premier that is often overlooked: al-
though the Seventh Circuit did not allow Premier to assert offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion against the class defendant, it applied the
principles of stare decisis. Depending on its interpretation, this misguided
ruling may have serious consequences for opt-out class members in the
future.
E. STARE DECISIS
Although Premier is commonly cited as the main precedent for denying
opt-out class members the opportunity to assert offensive nonmutual is-
sue preclusion against the class defendant, it also stands for the applica-
tion of another form of preclusion in class actions: Stare decisis.190 The
fact that the Premier court was not willing to apply offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion did not mean that it opposed all forms of preclusion. As
the court made clear, "[p]reclusion is not an all-or-nothing matter; there
are degrees." 191 Therefore, the court was willing to provide a "lesser de-
gree" of preclusion through the doctrine of stare decisis.192 Although of a
lesser degree, the court considered stare decisis sufficiently robust to vin-
dicate the ideals of judicial economy. The Seventh Circuit stated:
[O]nly the gravest reasons should lead the court in the opt-out suit
[the individual lawsuit brought by the opt-out class member] to come
to a conclusion that departs from that in the class suit.... We there-
fore approach the merits of this case [the individual lawsuit] with a
strong presumption in favor of the Fourth Circuit's disposition [in
the prior class action]. The presumption does not eliminate the need
189. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the Premier court's comment denying that the Su-
preme Court has adopted a "new version" of Rule 23).
190. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 367
(7th Cir. 1987).
191. Id.
192. Compare id. ("A decision by the Supreme Court that the Agreement violates the
Sherman Act would be authoritative, precluding further contention in Chicago. A decision
by the Fourth Circuit is not authoritative in district courts of the Seventh Circuit, but it is
entitled to respect, both for its persuasive power and because it involves the same facts.
The application of stare decisis will produce most of the judicial economy the district court
sought to achieve.") (citation omitted), with Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 201, 214
(D. Me. 2008) ("[Plaintiffs] request for summary judgment on some kind of special stare
decisis argument is misplaced. Obviously, I will give careful attention to the persuasiveness
of [the judge's] reasoning and the conclusion . .. reached in [the] class action partial sum-
mary judgment ruling when I apply the law to the facts of [Plaintiffs] case here. But, in this
respect, this case is no different from any other.").
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for independent analysis, but it does mean that doubts should be re-
solved in favor of the Fourth Circuit's disposition [in the prior class
action]. 193
This apparently innocuous holding may generate severe consequences
that have not attracted the attention it deserves. While offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion is directed at the parties, stare decisis binds-or is
persuasive authority to-the court.194 This makes a significant, albeit hid-
den, difference in practice because it reinstates the now-defunct doctrine
of mutuality through the back door. In other words, the resolution of any
issue in a class action would either bind or be persuasive authority in an
individual action brought by an opt-out class member, whether it bene-
fited or prejudiced either party. As the Premier court stated:
The value of the first decision as a prediction of how other courts will
act produces part of the savings. If the class wins, the opting-out
plaintiff should expect to win for the same reasons that persuaded
the first court. If the class loses, the opting-out plaintiff should expect
to meet the same fate.195
It becomes clear, therefore, that the Premier court is at least a sympa-
thizer of the symmetric comfort afforded by the mutuality doctrine. With-
out anyone noticing, Premier distorted everything known at the time
about preclusion and class actions. While denying offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion to benefit a nonparty (which Parklane allowed), Judge
Easterbrook permitted a nonparty to be bound-and prejudiced-by a
decision in a lawsuit in which the nonparty did not have a full and fair
opportunity to participate (which Parklane did not allow).196 Thus, the
class member who opted out of the class was precluded by the class judg-
ment under the guise of stare decisis.197 This goes against the most basic
principles of procedural fairness and makes a mockery of the opt-out pro-
vision in Rule 23. Premier, therefore, directly contradicts In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, a Fifth Circuit case decided two years ear-
lier, which held that an opt-out plaintiff is not precluded from litigating
an issue decided in favor of the defendant in a prior class action.198
But if one gives a narrow interpretation to Premier, as one must to
preserve the due process of law, the problems may not be as dreadful as
193. Premier, 814 F.2d at 367-68 ("The second litigation may safely concentrate on
[the] differences [between the prior class actions and the individual action], whether or not
issue preclusion comes into play.").
194. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979); Premier, 814 F.2d at
367-68.
195. Premier, 814 F.2d at 367.
196. Id. at 367-68, 371.
197. Id. at 371.
198. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 418-19 (5th Cir.
1985); supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761
(1989) (holding that with very few exceptions, an individual cannot be bound by a judg-
ment if he was not a party to the original lawsuit); In re Quality Beverage Co., 181 B.R.
887, 894 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot bind a person
who was neither a party nor privy to a prior suit.").
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they appear. Stare decisis, as a principle of adherence to legal precedents,
does not apply to decisions regarding issues of fact, which is the main
scope of issue preclusion.199 Of course, both stare decisis and issue pre-
clusion apply to the application of the law to issues of fact. 20 0 Technically,
the later court is only bound by the legal precedent contained in the hold-
ing, not by the factual findings. 201 Therefore, the later court must still
hear all the evidence and factual arguments from scratch and is free to
reach a different conclusion. This means that the parties in the opt-out
class member's individual lawsuit will still have an opportunity to conduct
discovery.
Whatever the result of the prior class action, not only is the court in the
later lawsuit not strictly bound by its precedent (especially if it came from
a different jurisdiction), but it may also distinguish the facts to avoid its
application. But this is a difficult proposition, considering that by defini-
tion the opt-out class members have issues of law or fact in common with
the class action. This double guarantee preserves the court's freedom to
decide the issues anew.
Perhaps that is what the Premier court meant when it said that the
application of stare decisis "does not eliminate the need for independent
analysis." 202 Even with such a narrow interpretation, however, Premier
failed to clarify the problem and propose an adequate solution.
The next Part will discuss how Premier misapplied Parklane in the spe-
cific facts of the case.
F. How PREMIER MISREAD PARKLANE
The Premier court mistakenly assumed that Parklane did not contain
the tools to resolve the problem it faced. 203 Parklane, however, gives trial
courts broad discretion to apply nonmutual issue preclusion whenever all
the traditional requirements are present unless doing so undermines judi-
cial economy or is unfair to the defendant. 204 In determining whether
judicial economy is undermined, courts generally do not allow a party to
take a wait and see attitude and sit idly on the sidelines while the first
case is litigated.205 Therefore, offensive nonmutual issue preclusion may
not be allowed if the plaintiff could have easily joined the earlier ac-
tion.206 In evaluating unfairness to the defendant, courts look at several
factors such as foreseeability, contradicting results, and differences in the
199. See Mendenhall v. CMI Corp., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also 20 AM.
JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2005); 47 Am. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2006).
200. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
201. See Mendenhall, 5 F.3d at 1570.
202. Premier, 814 F.2d at 368.
203. Id. at 363 ("We doubt, however, that Parklane contains the answer to our
problem.").
204. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); see supra Part II.D (dis-
cussing the Parklane factors).
205. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330 & n.13.
206. Id.
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procedural opportunities. 207
Premier accepted that the traditional requirements for issue preclusion
were present because the issues were the same, actually litigated, and
necessarily decided in a previous proceeding where the defendant had a
full and fair opportunity to present its case. 208 This will often be the situa-
tion in class action lawsuits because the issues are by definition common
to the whole class and because the matters at stake are of such magnitude
that the defendant will vigorously litigate the class action claims. In all
likelihood, the potentially severe consequences of losing a class action
will provide adequate motivation for a defendant to forcefully defend
against the class claim. Further, as a result of the potential for large judg-
ments in class action lawsuits, courts may engage in heightened scrutiny
of the proceeding, which may increase the reliability of a class award.
This in turn militates against the likelihood of an anomalous decision and
increases the level of fairness in the future application of issue preclusion
in individual lawsuits brought by opt-out class members.
Moreover, none of Parklane's exceptions would bar application of of-
fensive nonmutual issue preclusion in Premier.209 The only possible ex-
ception in dispute was whether Premier, the absent class member, could
have easily joined the earlier class action. Although Premier was a regu-
lar class member throughout the class proceeding, it sought exclusion
from the class at the close of litigation after finding the terms of the class
settlement insensitive to its legal claims.210 Under the terms of the settle-
ment, only class members who paid a certain illegal charge would be able
to recover.211 Premier, however, was in a different situation from the
other class members.212 Recognizing that the payment was illegal under
antitrust laws, Premier refused to make the payments and was sued.213
Unlike other class members, therefore, Premier's claim was not that it
paid the illegal charge, but that it incurred damages in connection with
the defendant's illegal collection lawsuits.214 According to the terms of
the class action settlement, Premier would not recover anything: its pecu-
liar claim was not even considered in the negotiations.2 5
Premier remained a class member for the first six years of the litiga-
tion,216 and opted out only after trying unsuccessfully to intervene in the
class action and establish a subclass to litigate its claims.217 Premier
207. Id. at 330-32.
208. Premier, 814 F.2d at 359-61.
209. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-32.
210. Premier, 814 F.2d at 359-61.




215. Id. at 360-61.
216. Id. at 363.
217. Id. at 360-61. Premier noted that the class action court had stated that the case
had:
progressed to the point that . . . it would be totally unfair to interrupt it by
permitting intervention along the lines requested . . . and redefining the
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brought its individual lawsuit mere days after opting out and tried unsuc-
cessfully to consolidate its individual lawsuit with the class proceeding
(over the defendant's objections). 218 Technically, Premier could not have
opted out earlier because there was no opportunity to do so (although in
practice it could have filed its individual lawsuit at any time). As previ-
ously discussed, the district court certified the class action and decided
the merits of the case simultaneously. 219 Moreover, the class notice was
issued several years after class certification, after the class judgment was
affirmed and the case was settled, thus making an earlier opt out impossi-
ble. 22 0 The law provides no opportunity for absent class members to opt
out before class action certification and class notice. So, contradictory as
it might seem, not only did Premier remain a class member for as long as
possible, it also opted out at the earliest practicable time. Premier, there-
fore, demonstrated its willingness to participate in the class proceeding-
thus satisfying the "easily joined" requirement under Parklane-and only
excluded itself from it when it was clear that there was no other alterna-
tive to protect its interests.
To expect Premier to remain in the class after its claim was ignored in
settlement negotiations would be unacceptable because its individual sit-
uation was different from the other class members. If Premier had re-
mained in the class, it would be bound by claim preclusion and would not
be able to assert its claims against the defendant. Yet, it would receive no
compensation for its alleged injury. Premier was held hostage to the very
same class action that was presumably brought to protect its interests.
It is true that Premier knew that its interests were not adequately rep-
resented (or that typicality was absent) for almost a year before the set-
tlement was finalized and before it moved to intervene in the class
action.221 For that reason, the court held that Premier could have easily
joined the earlier action and therefore, failed one of the Parklane re-
quirements.222 The Seventh Circuit ultimately blamed Premier for not
presenting its theory of damages earlier in the class litigation. 223
class. . . . Premier, being a member of the class in this suit, should, if it so
desires, object to the settlement, either that or seek to opt out of the settle-
ment and pursue any further claims it may have elsewhere.
Id. at 361 (quoting trial court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. One reason why the Parklane Court concluded that the class plaintiff could not
easily join the previous litigation was because "consolidation of a private action with one
brought by the SEC without its consent is prohibited by statute." Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 n.17 (1979) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (2006)).
219. Premier, 814 F.2d at 359-60, 363; see supra Part IV.D (asserting that the simultane-
ous decision over certification and merits contributed to an unwarranted sense of outrage
that lead the Seventh Circuit to deny Premier the opportunity to assert offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion against the defendant).
220. Premier, 814 F.2d at 363; see supra Part IV.D.
221. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 627 F. Supp. 957, 961
(N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
222. Id. at 961-62.
223. Premier, 814 F.2d at 367.
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The Premier court failed to recognize, however, that its decision was
not applicable in all situations: class actions are complex structures; it is
never easy to intervene and actively participate in them. Assuming argu-
endo that Premier was a sophisticated player with a substantial individual
claim and could have tried to intervene, actively participate in the negoti-
ation, and contribute to its result, the same is not true of most class mem-
bers. It is not realistic or reasonable to expect that a regular class member
will have the clout to affect the outcome of class action negotiations.
First, objections can be very difficult and expensive to assert. 224 Most
class members will need independent legal counsel to interpret both the
notice and the proposed settlement to assess whether or not remaining in
the class is a better alternative than opting out.2 2 5 Furthermore, the pro-
ponents of a settlement plan usually have a significant financial stake in
the matter and, as a result, may vigorously attack objectors.226 It often
would be futile to challenge the class action machinery: the only realistic
option is to remain silent, opt out of the class, and go it alone.
In the class action context, therefore, it is unreasonable to interpret the
Parklane requirement to join in the earlier action 227 as demanding that an
absent class member formally intervene in the class action and become an
active class representative, as Premier tried to do. 2 2 8 It is unreasonable
because, in the class action setting, a class member is in unless that person
exercises the privilege of getting out. Therefore, joining a class action in
the Parklane context should simply mean not excluding oneself from the
class. If interpreted literally, however, this criterion would never be pre-
sent in a class action.229 By definition, an opt-out class member excluded
itself from the class. In contrast to traditional litigation, joining in a class
action requires almost no affirmative steps on the part of the class mem-
ber.2 30 The act of opting out of a class action requires far more proactive
conduct. 231 Additionally, as it is very difficult for absent class members to
224. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 97 (2007) ("Although courts that treat the
silence of class members as endorsement of the proposed settlement seem to think that a
class member could easily object, objecting to any proposed settlement, in fact, entails
significant costs for the would-be objector.").
225. Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action
Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litiga-
tion, 31 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 409, 417 (1998) ("Settlement fairness hearings are often heard
in remote areas of the country and involve complexities and procedural requirements that
usually necessitate representation by counsel.").
226. See generally Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REv. 1051, 1102-15 (1996) (describing the abusive tactics used in settlement
hearings).
227. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) ("The general rule should
be that . .. where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where ...
offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow. . . offen-
sive collateral estoppel.").
228. Premier, 814 F.2d at 360-61.
229. See Furman, supra note 122, at 1199.
230. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 49 (2012).
231. See id. H§ 99, 100.
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influence settlement conditions, 232 it is unfair to require that they remain
part of a class that does not properly represent their goals and interests. If
the true goal of the Parklane factors is to ensure a fair result for both
parties, 233 joining in is much less relevant in the class action context than
it is in individual lawsuits.
Another interpretation of Parklane may lead to the conclusion that, to
avoid the wait and see attitude,234 offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
should not be allowed if the class member only opted out to enjoy the
benefit of preclusion without its risks. 235 As previously discussed, how-
ever, whether the party could have easily joined the prior proceeding is
not a Parklane requirement. This is merely one factor that a court must
consider in determining whether the opt-out class member undermined
judicial economy. 236 Moreover, considering that allowing offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion might encourage more litigation, it is fair to say
that judicial economy was a minor consideration behind the Parklane
decision. 237
Another aspect has eluded most commentators. Considering the con-
flict of interest between Premier, the class representative, and other class
members, it can be argued that Premier's interest was not adequately rep-
resented by the class counsel, that the class representative was not typical,
or that there was no common question. The absence of any of these ele-
ments means that Premier was not a class member in the first place.2 3 8
Therefore, at least in principle, there was no need for Premier to formally
opt out of a class that it did not belong to. Because Premier was neither
adequately represented nor a class member, Premier was a true third
party to the class action. Ergo, the Premier court was doubly wrong in
denying the application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.239
A similar situation was presented in Tardiff v. Knox County, where the
class representative herself opted out when the settlement negotiated by
the class counsel turned out to be unacceptable because it did not prop-
erly account for her damages.240 The Tardiff court denied application of
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to find the defendant liable and its
232. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 226, at 1102-05.
233. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979).
234. Id. at 330.
235. See infra Part IV.L (discussing the possibility of allowing opt-out class members to
assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion whenever the class member has an indepen-
dent reason that justifies an interest in opting out of a class. In those cases there is no
reason to treat the class member as a person who will sit "idly on the sidelines" waiting to
benefit from the class judgment without the risk of being bound by it).
236. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Parklane factors).
237. See supra Part II.C-D (discussing judicial economy in the context of defensive and
offensive issue preclusion).
238. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940) (declining to afford preclu-
sive effect to a class judgment because the class representative was neither typical nor
adequate and because of the existence of a conflict of interest).
239. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion by non-class members).
240. Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206-07 (D. Me. 2008).
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conduct unconstitutional.241 The court relied on Premier and a 2008 draft
version of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.242
The district court in Premier analyzed the issue differently from this
Article, 243 yet it reached a similar conclusion.244 Even though the district
court noted that Premier had failed the wait and see factor, it still allowed
the application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion because the class
action defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and
because it would promote judicial economy. 245 According to the district
court, these considerations outweigh the eventual inequities of allowing a
free-rider to sit on the sidelines awaiting judgment in the first suit. 2 4 6 As
duly noted, the district court's decision in Premier was reversed on
appeal. 247
The next Part addresses the situation of those who are not within the
class definition and therefore are not class members. Because they are
true nonparties, and need not opt out, they can freely assert offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion against the class defendant if the require-
ments are present. By comparing the similar positions of opt-out class
members and non-class members, one must question the fairness of treat-
ing them differently.
G. ASSERTION OF ISSUE PRECLUSION BY NON-CLASS MEMBERS
Although controversy surrounds a class member who opts out of a class
and later seeks to benefit from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, the
same is not true of a person who is not within the class definition (or to
whom notice was not directed) and therefore is not a class member. A
non-class member can benefit from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
of a class judgment without the risk of being bound by it whenever the
requirements of issue preclusion are present.248
Moreover, a class member who did not opt out, but was not adequately
represented and later brings an individual suit is exempt from claim pre-
clusion, and may attempt to use offensive issue preclusion against the
class defendant. Arguing the opposite would mean reviving the mutuality
doctrine, long abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court. 249
241. Id. at 212-13.
242. The final version of the ALI Principles was published in 2010 with significant
changes. See infra Part IV.H.
243. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 627 F. Supp. 957,
962-63 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
244. Id. at 963.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Premier, 814 F.2d at 376.
248. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. Compare Comment, supra note 92
at 1245-46 (1975) (arguing against allowing class members who did not receive notice to
benefit from the class judgment), with Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. of Wis.,
329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (allowing class members who did not receive notice to
benefit from the class judgment).
249. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-37 (1979).
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This is in contrast with the situation of class members who exercise
their legal right to opt out of a class action. Curiously, after opting out of
a class action, class members become nonparties and non-class members
for all purposes, except for asserting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
against the defendant. A complete ban on the use of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion by opt-out class members, therefore, leads to different
outcomes in these similar situations.
The disparity between these two outcomes is troubling: There is no rea-
son why the general rules of issue preclusion should apply in one situa-
tion but not in the other.250 There is no convincing reason why opt-out
class members may be systematically denied the opportunity to assert
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in the same situations where any
other nonparty would be allowed to do so.
The following analysis also helps demonstrate the irrationality of not
allowing Premier to assert offensive issue preclusion against the class de-
fendant. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the real conflict of in-
terest between Premier, the other class members, and the class
representative, Premier originally wanted to create a subclass because its
interests were not common, typical, or adequately represented.251 The
class in Premier consisted of class members who paid a certain illegal
charge, but Premier was in a different situation because it refused to
make the payments and was sued.2 5 2 If the court had created a subclass,
Premier would likely be the only class member in it. Without numerosity,
this subclass would be decertified.253 If this happened, Premier-without
ever actively opting out of the class-would not be a class member any-
more. As a nonparty (instead of as an opt-out class member), Premier
would be allowed to assert offensive issue preclusion. 254
It could also be argued that Premier was not a class member because its
interests were not adequately represented by the class representative.
Moreover, it could be argued that the class definition was overinclusive
and there was no typicality. In these cases, Premier would also be a non-
250. See 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., ABA SEC. OF LITIG., BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 19:71 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011) ("[I]t is not easy to identify
a practical or theoretical basis for the view that persons opting out of a class action should
be precluded thereafter from making any offensive use of the judgment entered in the class
action. When a case is decided against defendants outside the class action context, a person
not involved in the lawsuit can seek to use the judgment offensively in subsequent litiga-
tion against the same defendant. It is not clear why persons opting out of a class action
should not have a comparable opportunity to assert offensive collateral estoppel based on
the outcome of the class action.").
251. Premier, 814 F.2d at 360-61; see also notes 209-215 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the peculiar situation of Premier).
252. Id. at 360.
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring class membership to be so numerous as to
make joinder impracticable); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5) (allowing a class to be divided into
subclasses, but requiring each subclass to be treated as a class for purpose of class
certification).
254. See supra Part II.D (discussing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
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party and could assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the
class defendant in its individual lawsuit.
As will be discussed below, the rationale behind this difference in out-
comes is that courts want to punish the class member for exercising their
opt-out rights. By opting out, the class member committed the repugnant
"choice" of excluding himself from the class. If that person, however, did
not fall within the class definition in the first place, everything is some-
how different: maybe because that person was "inherently" a
nonparty.255
A completely different consideration is whether issue preclusion is a
valid procedural rule in the first place. To be sure, this Article is not a
blind defense of the virtues of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. In a
previous publication, this Author argued against the adoption of any form
of issue preclusion in foreign countries.256 The objective of this Article is
different: to promote a coherent and equitable application of existing
procedural rules. Whatever the results might be of allowing opt-out class
members to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, they are no
more unfair than the use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in the
context of individual litigation. As long as this is the law, it is unfair to
deny it for opt-out class members but allow it to other nonparties. The
perpetuation of such a double standard is not acceptable and cannot be
based on whether the opt-out class member is a nonparty by choice or by
design.
But the double standard does not stop there. Although most courts are
reluctant to allow opt-out class members to assert issue preclusion against
a class defendant, at least one court had no hesitation in doing the oppo-
site.2 5 7 In a curious decision, the Eighth Circuit allowed a class defendant
to assert issue preclusion against the class as a whole based on a previous
individual lawsuit brought by some class members. 258 In Sondel v. North-
west Airlines, the class representatives filed a class action lawsuit in fed-
eral court against Northwest alleging disparate impact discrimination
against women because of a policy requiring a minimum height of 5 feet 2
inches for flight attendants. 259 When the state law claim was dismissed
from the federal class action, the same class representatives, represented
255. See infra Part IV.J (discussing the denial of preclusive effect as a punishment in
order to deter class members from exercising their right to opt out).
256. See Antonio Gidi, Jos6 Tesheiner & Marflia Prates, Limites Objetivos da Coisa
Julgada no Projeto de C6digo de Processo Civil: Reflexdes Inspiradas na Experi~ncia Norte-
Americana, 194 REPRO 101, 102 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1849208 (advising against introduction of the concept of issue preclusion in
civil-law countries, mostly because its application is unpredictable and unnecessarily com-
plex, with many prerequisites and exceptions, and would waste time and energy instead of
saving them); see also James F. Flanagan, Offensive Collateral Estoppel: Inefficiency and
Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARIz. ST. L.J. 45, 52 (1982); Michael D. Green, The Inability of
Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbes-
tos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 200 (1985).
257. See Sondel v. Nw. Airlines, 56 F.3d 934, 940-41 (8th Cir. 1995).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 936.
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by the same attorneys, filed a class action in Minnesota state court to
pursue the state claim.260
The Minnesota state court refused to certify the class action because of,
inter alia, a lack of superiority and predominance. 261 Proceeding as an
individual lawsuit, the case went to trial and was decided on the merits in
favor of the defendants, who established a non-discriminatory reason for
the height requirement. 262
Following the state court decision, Northwest asserted offensive issue
preclusion against the whole class-not only the class representatives
who were the plaintiffs in the previous state individual lawsuit. 2 6 3 The
district court granted Northwest's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the federal class action with prejudice because the absent class
members were in privity with the plaintiffs in the individual state court
lawsuit. 264 The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs in the individual
lawsuit in state court were the class representatives in the federal court
class action, they represented the interests of the absent class members in
the state suit even though the class certification was denied and the case
proceeded on an individual basis. 265 The court was also influenced by the
fact that "the same attorneys who represented the state court plaintiffs
[were] the class counsel in the federal class action." 266 Therefore, all ab-
sent class members were bound by issue and claim preclusion on the mer-
its of the class claim.2 67
In reaching this awkward conclusion, the Eighth Circuit was also con-
cerned that the class counsel would not "introduce [in the federal class
action] any additional evidence beyond that presented at the state [indi-
vidual] trial."268 This decision seriously upsets the delicate due process
balance that exists in binding absent class members in representative liti-
gation. In a fantastic twist of logic, that opinion held that the absent class
members could be bound by a judgment without the possibility of being
benefitted by it: an inverted violation of the mutuality doctrine.
Because there is no reason to treat opt-out class members differently
from any other nonparty, they should be allowed to assert nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion against the class defendant whenever the re-
quirements are present. The next Part discusses a recent development in
the area: the ambiguous solution proposed by the ALI's Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 936-37.
262. Id. at 937.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 938-40.
266. Id. at 940.
267. Id. at 941.
268. Id. at 940.
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H. THE ALI's PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
The most recent troubling development in this area is the ALI's Princi-
ples of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. In language that remained sub-
stantially similar in several early drafts, the Principles stated peremptorily
that "[c]laimants who exercise their opportunity to avoid the preclusive
effect of the aggregate proceeding . . . [by opting out] should not enjoy
the benefit of . . . the preclusive effect of the judgment in the aggregate
proceeding." 2 69 The proposal was unmistakable: class members who
opted out would not be bound by nor benefit from the class judgment.
This clear interpretation was reinforced by the comments: "Because exit
protects claimants from the detriment of any judgment in the aggregate
proceeding, the same claimants likewise should not enjoy the preclusive
benefit of any such judgment."270 The language was evocative of the ear-
lier proponents of the obsolete doctrine of mutuality.271 It served as a
threat or message to class members: opt out at your own risk!
But when the Principles were finally approved and published, the lan-
guage had changed significantly. The final version now reads, somewhat
cryptically and tautologically: "[C]laimants who exercise their opportu-
nity to avoid the preclusive effect of the aggregate proceeding [by opting
out] . . . should be treated as nonparties to that proceeding." 2 7 2 The new
language accomplishes the feat of being both obvious and ambiguous.273
If a class member is considered a party for purposes of preclusion, 274 it is
obvious that a class member who opts out of the class must lose that
status and be considered a nonparty-so far, so good. But that interpreta-
tion leaves the proposed rule with absolutely no meaning. What does it
mean to say that the opt-out class member shall be considered a non-
party? The final version, contrary to all previous versions, does not an-
swer whether the opt-out class member will be allowed to assert
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion like any other nonparty. By at-
tempting to assign a meaning to the rule, one opens the door for interpre-
tation and manipulation.
At least three theories can explain this mysterious last-minute shift.
The first theory is that no substantive change was intended. After all, in
the comments, the Principles still maintain that "individual claimants who
[opt out] are nonparties vis-A-vis the aggregate proceeding. The most fa-
269. AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.08(b)(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
270. Id. § 2.08(b)(1) cmt. g.
271. See supra Part II.B (discussing the erosion of the mutuality doctrine).
272. AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 2.07(b).
273. That the American Law Institute was not able to commit to a single unmistakable
rule is a testament to the level of controversy and disagreement that surrounds the topic.
274. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 362
(7th Cir. 1987) (stating that class members are "to be treated as full-fledged parties to the
case, with full advantage of a favorable judgment and the full detriments of an unfavorable
judgment"); AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 1.01(b)(3) (stating that a person "belong[ing]
to a class of persons similarly situated" will be bound by the result of litigation if he is
represented by a party).
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miliar and straightforward consequence of this nonparty status is that in-
dividual claimants who exit receive neither the benefit nor the detriment
of the preclusive effect exerted by the judgment in the class action." 275
If this were the correct interpretation, the comment would be even less
helpful because it would be clearly wrong, which throws even more mys-
tery into the mix. It is simply incorrect to say, as the Principles do, that
"[t]he most familiar and straightforward consequence of . .. nonparty
status is that [nonparties] receive neither the benefit nor the detriment of
the preclusive effect." 276 At least since Blonder- Tongue and Parklane, the
"familiar rule" in federal courts is that nonparties may benefit from, but
not be bound by, preclusion obtained in a different proceeding against
the defendant.277
The second theory behind the mysterious shift is that by changing the
language, the ALI intended to make a substantial alteration in the mean-
ing of the rule. Since class members who exercise their prerogative to opt
out of the class are treated as regular nonparties, Parklane must apply to
these individuals. 278 As a result, opt-out class members will be treated as
nonparties to the litigation and will be able to take advantage of the fa-
miliar rule in federal courts that nonparties may benefit from, but are not
bound by the class judgment.279
There is yet a third theory to explain the mysterious last-minute shift in
the language of the Principles. If no substantial change was intended, one
is left wondering why the ALI did not retain the original language, which
was direct and unmistakably clear. Why did the ALI decide to be ambigu-
ous if in previous versions it had shown that it was possible to be clear?
Likewise, if the ALI intended to change the meaning of the rule to de-
note the opposite result, why not do so in the same unambiguous manner
as it had done before? For this reason, the third theory is more credible
than the previous ones. Apparently, the problem was so intractable that
the ALI decided simply to acknowledge the existence of the problem
without resolving it, leaving the hard work to the courts-exactly the way
it was before the enactment of the Principles.
The next Part, through the expression that gives title to this Article,
discusses the fragile position of opt-out class members, attributing to their
275. AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 2.07 cmt. g. This is also a change from comments in
the previous versions.
276. Id.
277. The Supreme Court reinforced its decades-long commitment to abandon mutuality
in Smith v. Bayer Corp., when it considered "a commonplace of preclusion law-that non-
parties sometimes may benefit from, even though they cannot be bound by, former litiga-
tion." See 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 n.10 (2011) (relying on both Parklane and Blonder-
Tongue). As previously discussed, long gone is the time when one could say "[i]t is a famil-
iar rule that estoppels by judgments must be mutual, and that one party cannot be bound if
the other is not." Goodnow v. Litchfield, 19 N.W. 226, 229 (Iowa 1884); see supra Part II.B
(discussing the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine).
278. See supra Part IV.G (discussing the assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion by non-class members).
279. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Smith, 131 S. Ct.
at 2380 n.10; see supra Part II.C-D (discussing defensive and offensive issue preclusion).
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loneliness the reason why their needs and interests are ignored in class
action policy debates.
I. THE LONELY PosrIoN OF OPT-OUT CLASS MEMBERS
To truly understand the position of opt-out class members in the class
action context, one must appreciate the fact that their position is ex-
tremely lonely. To begin, they do not have strength in numbers.280 More-
over, they do not have a common representative: there is no one out
there to champion their cause, give them a voice, or protect their inter-
ests. Inertia works against opt-out class members in every way.
The defendant, naturally, is not on their side, but the defendant is only
the most obvious enemy. Class counsel has a legal duty to protect the
interests of the class. 2 81 Moreover, attorney's fees are generally corre-
lated to the size of the class 2 8 2 and this generates a conflict of interest
with class members: It is in the class counsel's best interest to minimize
opt-outs. 2 83 That is one of the reasons why it is common for class counsel
to prefer certification of a class action as a type that does not afford the
opportunity to opt out (or to receive notice).284 Class counsel, therefore,
has no incentive to help members who need to opt out and nothing to
gain by protecting the interests of those who do. Consequently, the class
280. See TIDMARSH, supra note 119, at 10-11 (providing number of class members who
opted out of mass tort settlement class actions); WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 52-53
("In all four districts, the median percentage of members who opted out was either 0.1%
or 0.2% of the total members of the class and 75% of the opt-out cases had 1.2% or fewer
class members opt out."); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 119, at 1546, 1548-49. But see
Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: an Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L. REV. 1123, 1150
(1974) (citing cases in which opt outs reduced class size from 39 to 73%).
281. As a matter of fact, even the class members are alone in the class proceeding. Even
fully dedicated, adequate, and idealistic class counsel are bound to be more concerned with
the interest of the class as a whole, in the big picture, than with the interests of absent class
members individually. See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 126, at 718 n.98 (1940)
("From one point of view the requirement of the initial client does seem anachronistic; the
class is the real client and the situation does not readily adjust to orthodox notions of the
lawyer-client relationship."); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New
Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 889, 903 (1968) ("[Tlhe client is, in reality, the class itself."); David L. Shapiro, Class
Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 960 (1998) ("[T]he
class itself is-or at least should be-the claimant, and the represented litigant.").
282. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28, 49 (2004) (stating
that in class actions, attorney's fees are generally calculated as a percentage of recovery,
and "that the level of client recovery is by far the most important determinant of the attor-
ney fee amount").
283. See, e.g., In Re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 29 (2000) (stating
that there is an inherent conflict between the class members who want to remain in the
class and those who want to opt out and that the class counsel represents only the class
members who remain in the class).
284. The other reason is to avoid having to comply with the stringent prerequisites of
superiority and predominance. See generally John E. Kennedy, Class action: The Right to
Opt Out, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 3, 57-58 (1983) ("Attempts to use the (b)(1) or (b)(2) catego-
ries . . . are usually premised on a desire to avoid the mandatory pre-trial notice and opt-
out rights of Rule 23(c)(2), or other barriers of the (b)(3) category.").
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counsel also does not adequately protect the interests of opt-out class
members.
Unfortunately, opt-out class members can expect no better from the
court, which has its own agenda and is more concerned with big-picture
procedural economy and clearing its docket. By definition, the party
before the court is the class, so the interests of opt-out members are not
properly within the court's jurisdiction (unless the individual lawsuits and
the class action are consolidated). The court's duty is only to protect the
class members before it.28 5 Concern for economy and efficiency trumps
the legitimate interests of opt-out class members in the court where the
individual lawsuit was brought,286 but it is more evident in appellate
courts who are naturally more concerned with the big picture.287 There-
fore, opt-out members cannot expect sympathy from the courts either.
Finally, opt-out class members should not count on the powerful law-
yers who have large portfolios of similar, individual cases, because these
lawyers have their own agendas and interests, and play by their own
rules.
This situation has also significantly influenced the state of class action
scholarship. For intellectual, ideological, or professional reasons, the most
influential class action scholars are generally aligned with the interests of
either the class counsel or the defense counsel. Some scholars may even
identify with the interests of the class itself, the defendants, or the court
system. But none reflect the perspective of non-class members or opt-out
class members.
All relevant players, therefore, are substantially "aggregationists"-ei-
ther by conviction or by professional interest-an expression that can be
taken here as a derogatory neologism for actors committed to aggregate
litigation, even at the expense of the individual interests of absent class
members, opt-out class members, and non-class members. Therefore, it is
no surprise that opt-out class members are often vilified as free riders: the
overall attitude is hostile. And since they have no voice, the system is
completely rigged against them, nobody takes their interests seriously,
and there is nothing they can do about it.
The only actors whose interests are in principle aligned with the inter-
ests of opt-out class members are the small solo practitioners who do not
285. See, e.g., id. (stating that "the district court's duty is to the class members them-
selves," not to opt-out class members).
286. But see William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from
Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 790, 811 (2007) (stating, in the similar context of a class mem-
ber collaterally attacking in individual lawsuits the adequacy of the representative in a
prior class action, that the second court, the one in the individual lawsuit, would be drawn
to the argument raised by the class member).
287. Compare Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 627 F. Supp.
957 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (trial court allowed opt-out class member to assert offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion because it would represent procedural economy in the case), with
Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987)
(court of appeals did not allow opt-out class member to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion because it would not represent procedural economy in the long run). See also
supra Part IV. B (discussing promotion of economy and fairness).
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work with large aggregation cases and may have one or two such cases in
their careers. They are not relevant players and do not have the intellec-
tual clout, political interest, or financial means to influence law reform,
ALI debates, legal scholarship, or court precedents. 288
One curious anecdote illustrates the point well. In the 2006 ALI An-
nual Meeting, one practitioner addressed the Reporters of the then draft
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation:
I am concerned with § 2.08(b). You seem to have a bias against
people who want to opt out, who don't want to participate, and you
have certain punishments.... I just think it is a heavy-handed way of
saying that you can opt out, but you're going to be punished for do-
ing so. 289
Aggregationists have developed several other methods-legitimate or
otherwise-to punish or discourage class members from opting out. One
of these methods is to provide for a poison pill in the settlement offer,
withdrawing it in case of an unacceptable number of opt-outs. The Vioxx
settlement (which was not a class action) imposed several significant limi-
tations on opting out of the settlement, including requiring the attorney
to counsel the client to accept the offer and to withdraw from the case if
the client did not do s0.290 Another method to discourage opt-outs is the
inclusion in the settlement of the so-called "most favored nation" provi-
sion, which requires the defendant to improve the deal for all settling
class members if, in the future, it makes a better deal with any class mem-
288. Case in point: In order to prevent opt-out class members from asserting offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion against the defendant, the ABA Section of Litigation proposed
allowing courts "to attach conditions to a request for exclusion or to prohibit exclusion
altogether." CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 127, at 207. The court would use a number of
factors to "determin[e) whether it is appropriate that members of a class may be excluded."
Id. Because the report was drafted by a committee of eminent lawyers and judges with
experience in class actions and aggregate litigation, see id. at 196, it could unfortunately
have a profound practical impact on future class members who might need or want to opt
out from a class action. If this proposal is adopted, the opt-out would no longer be a right
but a privilege granted by the court on a case-by-case basis, possibly with restrictions or
under conditions. And what is worse, at the time a court makes the decision whether to
allow, prohibit, or impose conditions on the right to opt out, the only voices that the court
will hear are the class counsel's and the defendant's, The voice of the absent members will
not be heard, unless the court provides two notices.
289. AM. LAW INST., PROCEEDING OF ALI ANNUAL MEETINGS: 83RD ANNUAL MEET-
ING 107 (2006) (statement by Mr. Peter F. Langrock) (Debating Discussion Draft (April
21, 2006) on a point directly related to the topic herein addressed). The General Reporter
Professor Issacharoff answered:
Our intent was not to punish, but not to let [opt-out class members] benefit
strategically [because) we don't want [them) to come into a subsequent law-
suit and claim issue preclusion from the defendant having lost in a case in
which [they) chose not to have [their) rights be at risk. This is consistent with
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, in our view.
Id. This dialogue is evocative of the old mutuality doctrine as well as the argument that the
1966 amendment rejected one-way intervention. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the 1966
Amendment's purpose to abolish one-way intervention).





ber who opts out.29 1 This provision assures the class members who re-
mained in the class that they will get the best deal possible and gives the
defendant a powerful negotiating tool against opt-out class members,
who usually expects to get a better deal individually than what they could
obtain as class members. 292
Because of their lonely position, it is not really surprising that the inter-
ests of opt-out class members are consistently undermined by the inter-
ests of aggregationists. The next Part discusses the real reasons why opt-
out class members are systematically denied the right to assert offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion as any regular nonparty could: the denial is
used as a strategic weapon to punish and deter class members from exer-
cising their constitutional right to opt out.
J. DENIAL OF PRECLUSIVE EFFECT AS A PUNISHMENT OF AND
DETERRENCE TO OPTING OUT
Class actions are generally complex structures. Most involve defend-
ants charged with intricate violations of antitrust, securities, antidis-
crimination, or labor laws, which are often extremely difficult to prove.
Some facts are extremely complex, demanding highly sophisticated
knowledge of medical, financial, or other scientific or technical subjects.
The legal arguments may be equally difficult or involve complex, multifa-
rious, or novel legal concepts. These cases require intense commitment
and enormous financial investment. Therefore, to be successful, it is nec-
essary to build a major structure with competent technical and legal ex-
pertise at a multidisciplinary level. It is both a costly and a risky venture
that is only possible because aggregation leads to economies of scale.2 93
Because this sophisticated structure is only cost efficient with the lever-
age of a large class, an opt out en masse may compromise the economic
viability of the litigation built by class counsel. Hence, it is essential to
preserve class cohesion as much as possible.
It is therefore important to be intellectually honest about the reasons
behind disallowing opt-out class members asserting offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion against the class defendant. The reason is not mutuality.
The mutuality doctrine has been moribund for at least seventy years and
dead for at least thirty, so that cannot be the reason.294 The reason also
291. See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust, 215 F.3d at 28.
292. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 119, at 39 (reporting that absent class members who
opted out of a class action settlement were able to settle their individual claims for higher
amounts than the one offered to class members).
293. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amend-
ment, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-103 (1967) ("Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing proce-
dural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."); Kaplan, supra note 129, at
390; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, §§ 1:7-1:10 (discussing the overlapping objectives of class
action litigation, including compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and legitimacy).
294. See supra Part II.B (discussing the slow process of decline of the doctrine of
mutuality).
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cannot be a professed aversion to one-way intervention, a practically ir-
relevant and obscure practice that existed in only a few courts2 9 5 (and in a
few law professors' articles) before the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.296
If Parklane allows any third person to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion, why not allow an opt-out class member the possibility to do
the same? 2 9 7 Denying such a possibility is nonsensical since the opt-out
class member is by definition a nonparty connected to the class by com-
mon questions of law and fact.29 8
One can start to understand the obsession against opt-out members as-
serting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against class defendants only
by appreciating that the real reason is that this denial works as a punitive
measure to dissuade class members from opting out of the class. By opt-
ing out, the class member committed the repugnant "choice" of excluding
himself from the class. If that person, however, did not fall within the
class definition in the first place, everything is somehow different: maybe
because that person was "inherently" a nonparty instead of choosing to
become one. It is the exercise of this constitutional right 2 9 9 to opt out that
some courts and commentators think should be punished or deterred.
A reaction against this rebellious behavior is in order. By removing the
possibility of benefiting from the class judgment, aggregationists hope
that this will create one more artificial obstacle to an already difficult
situation,300 resulting in fewer class members exercising the right to opt
out.30
295. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir.
1961) (one of the few examples in which the one-way intervention was allowed).
296. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the connection between the 1966 Amendment's
abolition of one-way intervention and rejection to opt-out class members asserting offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion).
297. See supra Part IV.G (discussing the assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion by non-class members).
298. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2).
299. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) ("[W]e hold that due
process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff [in a class action seeking claims
wholly or predominately for money judgments] be provided with-an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion'
form to the court."). Although Shutts was limited to class action for damages, it seems that
the best rule is to allow class members to opt out of a class whenever doing so is possible.
See AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 2.04 (proposing the novel concept of the indivisibility of
the class action remedy or of the class substantive right as a criterion to determine the right
to opt out); see also Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Coun-
tries, 51 AM. J. Comp. L. 311, 350-54 (2003) (discussing the indivisibility of class claims
from a comparative perspective and suggesting that "[r]ecognition of the concept of indi-
visible class claims would be an important evolution in American class action law. . .. [F]or
example, to decide whether there should be a right to 'opt out' of the class or not.").
300. See infra Part IV.K (discussing the difficult financial and technical hurdles opt-out
class members face to bring an individual lawsuit against the class defendant).
301. See Currie, supra note 28, at 287 n.15 ("No claimant will [stay in a class action] if,
without being bound by an unfavorable judgment, he can obtain the benefit of a favorable
one."); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at 796 ("[T]here would be no reason not
to opt out."); Ratliff, supra note 39, at 88-89 ("[N]onmutual collateral estoppel [is] a pri-
mary threat to the effectiveness of class actions.").
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This utilitarian approach may be a legitimate reason to deny offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion to opt-out class members, but courts and
commentators must be transparent about their rationale, if they want a
more well informed debate. The question remains whether the policy of
giving supremacy and effectiveness to class action litigation supersedes
the policies of allowing parties to control their own litigation and of pro-
moting finality against a party who has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate an issue. But this is the clear choice before us.
It may be that courts are willing to continuously retry issues that were
put to rest in previous class action suits-in effect punishing themselves-
only to castigate class members who had the petulance to exercise their
right to exclude themselves from a class in which they did not want to
participate. Indeed, it may be that the appetite to punish opt-out class
members is stronger than the desire to prevent a class defendant from
taking multiple bites at the apple after final resolution of an issue in a
proceeding in which the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate.
Adolf Homburger, writing almost a decade before Parklane, did not
think so:
[W]ould it not also make a mockery of the law if, in a jurisdiction
that has abandoned the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, the court
and the litigants must endure a second complex litigation on the
same subject matter, merely to teach the opted-out member a les-
son? And if that second litigation ends in a judgment favorable to
the opted-out member, should the court have to suffer a third trial if
another member of the class who likewise opted-out relies on collat-
eral estoppel by reason of the first or second judgment? 302
Denying opt-out members the possibility of asserting nonmutual offen-
sive issue preclusion against the class defendant punishes the courts (who
will have to retry an issue previously decided) and rewards class defend-
ants (who will be able to retry an issue decided against it) only to dis-
suade class members from opting out of the class. To start an honest
discussion about the topic, therefore, it is essential to avoid a vindictive
and retributive reaction fueled by greed, frustration, or misguided notions
of fairness and efficiency. Understanding the issues is the first step in
resolving the problem. 303
302. Homburger, supra note 147, at 647 (footnote omitted); see also 5 RUBENSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 80, § 16:28 ("Waiting on the sidelines is a luxury few absent class members
can afford. Those who can may have extenuating and supplemental factual circumstances
and should not be penalized because they may share class characteristics as well.").
303. Compare FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 16.8, at 795 (stating, in a different
context, that "this approach smacks of the now discredited notion of mutuality of estoppel,
which having been rejected in most jurisdictions as neither fair nor logical, should not be
embraced in the class-action setting"), with id. at 796 ("Although this problem raises many
of the same concerns as the general mutuality-of-estoppel notion, two additional factors in
the opt-out setting appear to justify something in the nature of quasi-mutuality
treatment.").
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The final important step in understanding the issues being discussed is
to recognize the practical difficulties that class members face in exercising
their right to opt out. This is discussed below.
K. THE PRACTICAL REALITY OF THE RIGHT TO OPr Our
Rule 23 allows class members the unconditional right to opt out. 3 0 4 The
Supreme Court has held that the right to opt out is a due process guaran-
tee in class actions for damages. 305 However, that right does not come
without burdens and responsibilities. Class members who opt out are
alone because they have no right to the fund generated by the class judg-
ment or settlement. If they want to obtain relief for their claims, they
need to actively pursue their own individual lawsuits against the defen-
dant. This requires hiring an attorney and possibly incurring substantial
expenses and considerable risk.30 6 Opting out, of course, is only advisable
in the few cases in which the individual claim is economically viable.307
In face of all the difficulties, it is safe to conclude that a plaintiff who
opts out of a class is fully committed to go it alone.308 First, very few
classes are ever certified,309 making reliance on a class-wide resolution of
the controversy a gamble at best. In addition, of those class actions that
are certified, the vast majority will be terminated by class-wide settle-
ments. 310 A settled class action will not have any issue preclusion effect
on nonparties or opt-out class members, unless some issues were actually
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) ("[T]he court will exclude from the class any mem-
ber who requests exclusion. . . ."); see also Rutherglen, supra note 185, at 281 ("If [class
members] exercise their right to opt out, they are simply making a decision which, as a
matter of substantive law, they are entitled to make."); id. at 283 ("[T]he right to opt out
has a strong claim to being characterized as substantive. If denying the right to opt out
denies class members a realistic opportunity to pursue individual actions, then it denies
them a substantive right.").
305. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) ("We hold that due
process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff [in a class action seeking claims
wholly or predominately for money judgments] be provided with an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion'
form to the court.")
306. See supra Part IV.J (discussing the complexity and expense involved in class litiga-
tion, which requires intense commitment and enormous financial investment).
307. See Rutherglen, supra note 185, at 279. ("In general, the right to opt out has only
as much value as the individual class member's claim, determined according to its dis-
counted present value as of the time at which the right to opt out is exercised. If the claim
is not viable, then the right to opt out has no value.").
308. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 80, § 16:28 ("Waiting on the sidelines is a
luxury few absent class members can afford. Those who can may have extenuating and
supplemental factual circumstances and should not be penalized because they may share
class characteristics as well.").
309. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 78, at 280 (reporting that, according to a 2007
RAND Institute for Civil Justice Study, less than 15% of class actions were certified); 1
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 1.17 (reporting the figure above and concluding that "the
class probably got certified as a result of a settlement agreement").
310. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 10, 60 (finding that, of the four districts
studied, "a substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by class-wide
settlements"); Garth, supra note 79, at 501 (noting that, after certification, "most class
actions, like most litigation, settle prior to trial").
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litigated before settlement. 311 In addition, individual cases brought in fed-
eral courts are often consolidated or coordinated with their respective
class actions.312
Opting out is a legitimate procedural tool for class members who dis-
trust the adequacy of the representative, who fear conflicts of interest, or
who disagree with the strategy of the class proceeding.313 Another
equally valid reason to opt out is that it may be possible to obtain higher
judgments or settlements than those obtained by class members who re-
mained in the class.314 Nowhere in Rule 23 or in the advisory committee
notes, does it say that opt-out rights are disfavored or that courts could or
should deter or discourage class members from opting out and punish
those who do. 3 15
Although Parklane only speaks of unfairness to the defendant, it is rea-
sonable to assume that in the class action context, offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion cannot be allowed if it will operate unfairly upon the
class or class counsel.
When a class member decides to exercise the right to opt out of a class,
the class member is protecting a legitimate personal interest. The class
member's objective is not to undermine the class action effort, although it
may ultimately have that effect (especially in conjunction with other opt-
out members). This could be unfair to the class counsel who may have
311. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("[S]ettlements ordinarily occa-
sion no issue preclusion . . . unless it is clear ... that the parties intend their agreement to
have such an effect."); see also 5 RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 80, § 16:28 ("The likeli-
hood of settlement may also eliminate collateral estoppel rights."); supra Part II.A (dis-
cussing the requirements for the application of issue preclusion). The only exception to the
general rule, but one that does not concern us here, is that the adequacy of the settlement
in a previous class action is an issue that may not be relitigated on a subsequent malprac-
tice suit against the class attorney. See Thomas v. Powell, 247 F.3d 260, 262-63 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
312. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 14-15.
313. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 119, at 1530 ("Over time, [opt-out] has developed
into a fundamental part of class action practice. Indeed, the right to opt-out provides a key
premise for many of the basic principles that shape the (b)(3) action . . . .") (footnote
omitted); George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence, Compensa-
tion, and Necessity, 88 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1995 (2002) ("[T]he right to notice and to opt out
has remained at the center of class action litigation for the last three decades . . . .").
314. See, e.g., TIDMARSH, supra note 119, at 39 (reporting that absent class members
who opted out of a class action settlement were able to settle their individual claims for
higher amounts than the one offered to class members); Reed R. Kathrein, Opt-Outs,
MFNs and Game Theory: Can the High Multiples Achieved by Opt-Outs in Recent Mega-
Fraud Settlements Continue, A Discussion Draft, in SEC. LITIG. & ENFORCEMENT INST. 583,
588-90 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1620, 2007).
315. Not everyone agrees. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 100, at 756-57 (arguing
against an "excessive deference to unconstrained individualism" and proposing that absent
members should only be able to opt out if they can convince the court that they have
"good cause" to do so); see also CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 127, at 207 (a discussion
proposal from the ABA Section of Litigation Association allowing courts "to attach condi-
tions to a request for exclusion or to prohibit exclusion altogether"); Martin H. Redish &
Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural
Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1612-14 (2007) (criticizing the "waiver-through-total
passivity" nature of opt-out in class actions). The unfortunate proposal from the ABA
Section of Litigation was discussed supra at note 288.
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spent time and money to litigate the most difficult part of a massive con-
troversy. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that opt-out class members
cannot unfairly benefit from the work of the class counsel. That person
may legitimately be labeled a free rider. Class actions are sufficiently
profitable to justify class counsel's expense and effort, but in appropriate
cases, it might be fair for the court to order the plaintiff who opted out of
a class action to contribute at some level to the class counsel's attorney's
fees and expenses, from the plaintiff's own individual recovery. This is a
reasonable resolution, but nothing justifies holding class members hos-
tage to the class action-either directly prohibiting opt-outs, or indirectly
making their lives unnecessarily more difficult than non-class members.
Allowing opt-out class members to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion against the class defendant may appear unfair at first glance,
but it is no more unfair than other situations where such a device is al-
lowed. The mutuality train departed almost a century ago, and arguments
of unfairness to the defendant are no longer compelling. 316 Moreover, it
makes little sense to turn the whole procedural system upside down just
because of irrational fears of en masse opt-outs that rarely, if ever, mate-
rialize in practice. The anecdotal evidence and the empirical research sim-
ply do not support a fear of several opt-out class members bringing
individual lawsuits, making a mockery of the class action rule, and un-
fairly benefiting from the preclusive effect of the class judgment.317 Even
if that was the case, however, and such massive exclusion was to occur,
this should not be interpreted as a sign that there is something wrong with
the class members who, supposedly, are reasonable economic actors.
Maybe this is a sign that something is wrong with the class action itself.3 18
It is unnecessary to further weaken the position of an already vulnera-
ble party by taking away what Parklane gave all litigants thirty years
ago,319 using as excuse the obsolete technicalities of mutuality. It is con-
ceivable, but not probable, that the number of opt-out class members is
currently reduced because of the uncertainty regarding whether they
would benefit from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. And it is unde-
niable that if the device was more readily available, at least in some cases,
more class members would exclude themselves from the class. But this is
not a valid reason to justify such unequal treatment between nonmem-
bers and opt-out members.320 In any event, opt-outs occur with such low
316. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28, 335-37 (1979); see supra Part
II.B (discussing the erosion of the mutuality doctrine) and Part IV.C (discussing the use of
mutuality arguments against opt-out class members).
317. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 79 (proposing research on whether opt-out
plaintiffs "filed an action on the same issues that were addressed in the class action").
318. Cf Patrick Wooley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX.
L. REv. 571, 609-10 (1997) (linking the quantity of class members seeking to intervene in a
class action with the level of satisfaction with the representation of their interests).
319. See supra Part II.C-D (discussing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
320. See supra Part IV.G (discussing the incoherence and unfairness of allowing the
assertion of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion by non-class members, but denying the
same prerogative to opt-out class members).
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frequency that whatever minimal increase is caused by allowing opt-out
class members to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion would not
be a debilitating blow to efficiency.
One can even argue that by allowing opt-out class members to assert
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the class defendant, market
forces will lower costly attorney's fees, which would have to be reduced
to more acceptable levels to make opting out a less attractive option for
class members. Fears of massive opt out can also be a strong incentive for
adequate settlement offers. That is how one legitimately deters massive
opt outs, not by creating artificial barriers.
This Article, therefore, does not question that the legal system should
encourage class participation or class cohesiveness, but suggests that this
ideal must be reached by making class action more attractive to absent
class members, not by forcefully tying them to the class.
The practical reality of the constitutional right to opt out is that it is
worthless in most cases. It is only valuable when economically viable to
bring an individual lawsuit. Class members do not opt out from a class
action to undermine it, nor do they do so with the objective of sitting
"idly on the sidelines" 321 and benefitting from the class judgment without
the risk of being prejudiced by it. Class members opt out for legitimate
reasons, whatever they are. That is the whole reason why Rule 23 pro-
vided for a right to opt out and why this right may be constitutionally
required.
L. A POSSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND: ANALYZING THE
MOTIVES OF OPT OUT
As the argument comes to a close, it becomes clear that this Article
proposes a general rule allowing opt-out class members to assert offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion against the class defendant in all circum-
stances, whenever the requirements are present, exactly like any
nonparty.
But even for those against such rule, there must be some situations
where its use is justified. A middle ground must exist between a facile
rule prohibiting any opt-out class member from benefiting from the class
judgment and a rule that openly allows it in any circumstance. Even for
the opponents of the rule herein proposed, therefore, there is a clear
need for a more flexible standard that will consider all circumstances of a
case, and a refutation of the "categorical rule" proposed by Judge Easter-
brook in Premier.322
One such situation may occur when a class member has an independent
reason that justifies an interest in opting out of a class. After all, if the
class member will opt out anyway and pursue individual litigation regard-
321. See In re TransOcean Tender Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
322. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 367
(7th Cir. 1987) ("We conclude that class members who opt out may not claim the benefits
of the class's victory. . . . [T]his is a categorical rule.").
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less of the possibility of benefitting from offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion, there is no reason to punish or to deter. And there is no reason to
treat the class member as a person who will sit "idly on the sidelines" 323
waiting to benefit from the class judgment without the risk of being
bound by it. Furthermore, in these cases, there is no reason to suppose
that rejecting the application of issue preclusion will promote judicial effi-
ciency, if efficiency is the concern.
An early commentator, for example, argued that opt-out class mem-
bers should not ordinarily be allowed to assert nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion against the class defendant, except for "one exceptional situa-
tion": when the former class member has such a strong interest in suing
individually that it would have opted out even if not allowed to assert
issue preclusion against the defendant. 324 According to the author, offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion should be permissible when the absent
class member has a compelling reason to opt out. But, continues the au-
thor, offensive issue preclusion should not be available to those who opt
out simply to benefit from the class action preclusion without any risk of
being bound by an unfavorable judgment. 325
The author proposed, therefore, a strict inquiry into the subjective rea-
sons that motivated the class member to opt out.3 2 6 One factor to con-
sider, for example, is whether the plaintiff promptly brought an individual
lawsuit and prosecuted it vigorously, instead of sitting idly by waiting for
the class result. 327 The burden would be on the class member to convince
the court of the existence of a legitimate motive to opt out. 32 8
An interesting scenario illustrates this point. When a person brings an
individual lawsuit before a class action is filed, there can be no clearer
example in which a class member had an independent reason to bring an
individual lawsuit. She clearly did not opt out from a class to sit idly and
benefit from issue preclusion; she did not even opt out. She brought her
own lawsuit independently of the class action. Faced with this situation,
the Fourth Circuit admitted that this situation negated the notion that the
individual plaintiff was "poised on the sidelines of the class suit." Yet,
despite the fact that the plaintiff was not really an opt-out class member,
the court still declined to allow her to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion against the defendant. The court reasoned that she had had
"ample opportunity to join in the class action at a relatively early stage in
the litigation and thereby eliminate the need to have separate trials for
arguably similar claims." 329
The idea to create an exception for the situations when opt-out class
members have a strong interest in suing individually, as interesting as it
323. See In re TransOcean Tender Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
324. Furman, supra note 122, at 1191, 1199.
325. Id. at 1213.
326. Id. at 1205.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 782 F.2d 1196, 1202 n.7 (4th Cir. 1986).
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might be, is too narrow to take into account the "many possible reasons
why class members might elect to exclude themselves."3 30 One could
even go as far as saying that any reason to opt out is legitimate-there are
no illegitimate motives.
Indeed, the TransOcean court was not willing to investigate the subjec-
tive motives that prompted the class member to opt out.33 1 Those who
find it troubling that a class member who excluded from the class may
comply with Parklane's "easily join" factor may find solace in knowing
that this is only one factor among several others that a court must con-
sider before exercising its broad discretion to allow issue preclusion.332
The absence of one factor is not grounds to refuse application of offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion.333 Finally, in practice, attempts to con-
sider the motives of an opt-out class member are not only extremely
difficult, but futile because class members could simply manipulate their
behavior to adapt to the court's expectations. 334
Therefore, the rule that is most consistent with modern civil procedure
is to treat opt-out class members as any nonparty or any non-class mem-
ber and allow them in all situations, regardless of their motivation, to
assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the class defendant if
all prerequisites are present.
V. CONCLUSION
Great controversy surrounds the offensive use of nonmutual issue pre-
clusion by absent class members who opt out of a class action. The solu-
tion to this controversy will certainly revolve around the question of
which policy promotes judicial efficiency and fairness to the class as a
whole, the class members, the opt-out members, the defendant, the class
counsel, and the court.
Whether one likes it or not, qualified offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion is here to stay. Once the policy behind the doctrine of mutuality of
330. In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
331. Id. ("Courts which have enforced the offensive use of collateral estoppel have not
considered the motives of those plaintiffs who, though not joining in the first lawsuit, seek
the benefit of the judgment in a subsequent lawsuit. This court will likewise not indulge in
exploring the motives of the opt out plaintiffs . . . . The overriding considerations are
whether the defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the Delaware proceed-
ings and whether judicial economy would be served by an application of collateral
estoppel.").
332. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1979) (listing additional
"circumstances that might justify reluctance to allow the offensive use of collateral
estoppel").
333. See Furman, supra note 122, at 1202-04 (defending that either the easily join factor
is present because its objective is merely to avoid a wait and see attitude or that the fact
that it was not present is offset by the ample satisfaction of the other three factors); see also
RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 80, § 16:28.
334. See RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 80, § 16:28 ("Any attempt to examine the
motives of one who has chosen exclusion in order to determine whether the inability to
join the action easily requirement has been satisfied is ineffectual and would only promote
behavior by the party opting out of the suit which conforms to any standards which may
develop in this area.").
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estoppel was openly abandoned,335 no legitimate reason remains to insist
on its application exclusively for opt-out class members. There is no need
to significantly depart from the general rules and policies developed in
the past seventy years since Bernhard, Blonder-Tongue, Parklane, and
the ALI Restatement (Second) of Judgment.336 Using their "broad discre-
tion," courts need to adapt some of the traditional factors to the realities
of modern class action litigation (such as apportioning part of the individ-
ual award to contribute to class counsel's expenses and fees), 337 but a
rupture with this evolution is unnecessary.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the lonely position of the
opt-out class member338 and recognize that the main reason for denying
them the right to assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion has more to
do with deterrence and punishment than with fairness.339 Once that justi-
fication is realized, it becomes apparent that a universal canon against
such possibility is not a defensible proposition. Hopefully this acknowl-
edgment could lead to a more reasonable treatment of opt-out class
members.
Further, because most class actions settle, and settled class actions have
generally no issue preclusion effect, opt-out class members must be com-
mitted to litigating individually all issues of their claim. In practice, there-
fore, in the rare cases in which the individual members' claims are
economically viable, it is not realistic for the opt-out class member to sit
idly on the sidelines waiting for a favorable class judgment simply be-
cause there may never be a class judgment. The whole idea of class mem-
bers opting out to benefit from a favorable result without expense and
without the risk of being bound by an adverse judgment is not grounded
in reality, and a lawyer that gives such advice is probably flirting with
malpractice. There is a substantial probability that such a strategy will
backfire, and the class member will be stuck with the burden of proving a
complex claim from scratch, while the other class members would have
already received their settlement portion and benefited from the econ-
omy of scale and leverage afforded by class action litigation. 340
This Article can identify no legitimate reason why opt-out class mem-
bers should be guided by special preclusion rules that are not applicable
to non-class members. Accordingly, opt-out class members must be
335. See supra Part II.B (discussing the erosion of the mutuality doctrine).
336. See supra Part IV.C (demonstrating how objections to opt-out members asserting
offensive issue preclusion is an unwarranted return to the old mutuality doctrine).
337. See supra Part IV.K (proposing that the court to order opt-out class members, in
appropriate cases, to contribute at some level to the class counsel's attorney's fees and
expenses, from the plaintiff's own individual recovery).
338. See supra Part IV.I (discussing the lonely position of opt-out class members, whose
interests are ignored by all, and attributing to this fact the reason why their needs and
interests are unrepresented in all class-action policy debates).
339. See supra Part IV.J (stating that denying opt-out class members the possibility of
asserting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is used as a deterrence mechanism or a
punishment for opting out).
340. See supra Part IV.K (discussing the difficult financial and technical hurdles opt-out
class members face to bring an individual lawsuit against the class defendants).
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treated as any nonparty and allowed to assert offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion against the class defendant if all traditional prerequisites are
present.
